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INTRODUCTION

In FEC v. NRA PoliticalVictory Fund,' the D.C. Circuit found that
the composition of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), an independent agency,2 violated the constitutional principle of separation
of powers because the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House of Representatives served as ex officio nonvoting members of
the Commission. The court of appeals held that "the mere presence
of agents of Congress on an entity with executive powers offends the
Constitution."3 The D.C. Circuit's rebuff of Congress represents the
most extreme position ever taken by a court against Congress regarding the structural relationship between the legislative branch and the
administrative agencies. 4 After initially granting certiorari to determine the constitutionality of these ex officio nonvoting members of
the FEC, the Supreme Court dismissed the case on other grounds, 5
thus denying itself an opportunity to repair a damaged doctrine.
1
2

6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 115 S.Ct. 537 (1994).
See infra part I.D for a discussion of independent agencies.

3 NRA, 6 F.3d at 827.
4 Status of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority: Hearings on PendingLegislation
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,

104th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1995) (statement ofJohnny H. Killian, Senior Specialist American Constitutional Law, Congressional Research Service). Mr. Killian appeared before the
Senate Subcommittee to address the constitutional questions raised by various proposals to
amend the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986 after both the Supreme Court
and the D.C. Circuit found the Act unconstitutional. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports
Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise (CAAN), 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Hechinger v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 934. In Hechinger, the D.C. Circuit relied upon the NRA decision. Thus, Mr. Killian felt

it necessary to comment on NRA in discussing the proposed amendments to the Airports
Act. For a discussion of CAAN and Hechingersee infra parts II.E.3 and IV.B.2 respectively.
5 See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S.Ct. 537 (1994). In NRA, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether the presence of the ex officio nonvoting
members on the FEC violated the separation of powers principle. Id. After oral argument,
however, the Court decided that it could not reach the merits of the case, because the

FEC's organic statute did not authorize it to petition for certiorari on its own. Id. at 543-44.
The Court declared that the Federal Election

Campaign Act

(FECA),

2 U.S.C.
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This Note reconsiders the relationship between Congress and administrative government through a critique of the NRA case. In particular, it examines a "crucial innovation [reflected in the Supreme
Court's] post-1980 cases" and relied upon by the D.C. Circuit-the
distinction between legislative encroachment and independence. 6 In
the past, the Court has permitted Congress to separate the President
from the administrative process, thereby diminishing executive powers. But, the Court has consistently refused Congress any expansive
role within the administrative state. 7 Use of this judicial construct reflects an inherent judicial bias against the legislative branch and has
facilitated the constitutionalization of extreme and unnecessary curtailment of congressional initiative.
Part I of this Note examines the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
leading to the development of the distinction between legislative encroachment and independence. It demonstrates how this device has
encouraged an extraordinary bias against Congress within separation
of powers analysis. Part II examines the D.C. Circuit's decision in FEC
v. NRA Political Victory Fund by focusing upon Judge Silberman's extremist position. Part III critiques the NRA decision and posits that
the court's distinction between legislative encroachment and independence is ideologically flawed. It argues that this inadequate judicial
construct evolved not from a real fear of Congress, but rather from a
reluctance to confront the more difficult task of incorporating the values underlying separation of powers theory-preservation of individual liberty and protection from political tyranny. Part III suggests that
courts should adopt a more functional approach bolstered by a consideration of the values underlying separation of powers theory. Finally, this Note concludes that the extremism in the NRA decision is
inapposite to the traditional separation of powers framework. Moreover, the case should serve as a catalyst for change and should lead
toward an approach that is more consistent with the values underlying
separation of powers.
§ 437d(a) (6), requires the FEC to obtain permission from the Solicitor General to petition
for certiorari. Id. at 543. Furthermore, the Court found the Solicitor General's attempt to
remedy the situation retroactively by granting permission to the FEC on May 26, 1994
insufficient, because too much time had passed. Id. Petitions for certiorari must be filed
within 90 days of the entry of the judgment below, which, in this case, was October 22,
1993. Id. at 541 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c)).
6 Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 114 (1994).
7 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (finding the U.S. Sentencing
Commission constitutional); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (finding the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act constitutional); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating the provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act granting budget cutting authority to the Comptroller General); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto).
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I
BACKGROUND

A.

A Brief Discussion of Separation of Powers

The American separation of powers doctrine represents a deliberate choice made by the framers of the Constitution about the structure of government. The doctrine, which animates what Professor
Stephen Carter has termed the Political Constitution,8 aspires to improve government through a scheme which discourages institutional
self-dealing and promotes individual liberty.9 The doctrine dictates
the relationships between institutional actors and ensures that the system satisfies its two fundamental tenets: independence and interdependence.' 0 The framers recognized that effective government
requires fundamentally independent branches," but that there
should also be a working interdependence in which each branch
"checks and balances self-interested behavior by the other
branches.' 2 To some degree, these principles are in conflict. Nevertheless, the American constitutional system is 3"an amalgam of the separation of powers and checks and balances."'
The separation of powers doctrine was introduced and best articulated in the writings of James Madison. In the Federalist,Madison
explained:
The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary
in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
8 The term, Political Constitution, refers to the structural clauses of the Constitution.
For a discussion of this concept, see Stephen L. Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar. The
Evolution and SubsequentDe-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 719, 778-

800. According to Carter, the Constitution prescribes a system of balanced and separated
powers that the courts ought to enforce. Carter, a formalist, advocates that "[i]n interpreting structural clauses, more than in any other aspect of constitutional adjudication, courts
ought to be guided by sources more concrete than moral philosophy or their own intuitions about right and wrong." Id. at 780.
9 Rebecca L. Brown, SeparatedPowers and OrderedLiberty, 139 U. PA. L. Ray. 1513, 1534
(1991) ("In general, then, separation of powers is aimed at the interconnected goals of
preventing tyranny and protecting liberty."). I use the term "institutional self-dealing" because when one branch accumulates too much power, it leads to tyranny.
10 Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate about Legislative-Executive Separation
of Powers, 72 CoimuL. L. REv. 430, 434-35 (1987). Sargentich writes:
It often is taken for granted that the American doctrine of the separation of
powers has two main tenets. First, it is thought that the three major
"branches" of government should be kept in some fundamental sense separate. Second, this separateness should permit a working interdependence

in which each branch, in guarding its own prerogatives, effectively checks
and balances self-interested behavior by the other branches.
Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 M.J.C. ViLE, Separation of Powers, in ENCYCLOPEDIA Or THE AMmRiucN CoNsTrrtriON
1659, 1659 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).

1342

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1338

hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny.... [T] he preservation of liberty requires,
that the three great departments of power should be separate and
4

distinct.1

Madison recognized the importance of separating the strands of gov5
ernment, but he did not suggest that this separation be absolute.1
Herein lies the need for interdependence. Madison cautioned
against excessive accumulation of power by noting that "where the
whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."' 6
Accordingly, government can be both independent and interdependent at the same time, because separation of powers "does not
require that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments
should be wholly unconnected with each other.' 7 Rather, "the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be
directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that [no department] ought to possess
directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the
administration of their respective powers."' 8 For the most part,
Madison assumed that separation of powers is self-executing through
internal checks because each department is given "the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of
the others."' 9
The Federalist Papers, however, did not envision the government's branches as equally empowered, because its authors were influenced by their experience with a weak executive in state government
during the period following the Declaration of Independence. In that
period, many state constitutions incorporated a strict division of authority between the branches of government: "Contemporary political
observers came increasingly to conclude that these constitutions had
unwittingly permitted the emergence of a new species of dangerous
concentration of power.., in the hands of the legislature." 20 According to Professor Cynthia Farina, these state legislatures "not only legislated with what many regarded as irresponsible abandon but also
began to engage, under the guise of lawmaking, in executive andjudi14

THE FEDERALIST

15

Id.

16

Id. at 325-26.

17

THE FEDERALISr

18

Id.

No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Cynthia 1K Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance ofPower in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 490 (1989) (citing ThomasJefferson, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 120 (W. Peden ed., 1954) and THE FEDERALISr No. 47 (James Madison)).
19

20

THE FEDERALisT
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cial tasks."2 1 The legislature's "constitutional powers being at once
more extensive and less susceptible of precise limits, it can with
greater facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the
'22
encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.
Although the Constitution embodies the separation of powers
doctrine, it fails to articulate a general principle of separated powers.2 3 Articles I, II, and III comprise specific textual provisions outlining the structure of government, but they do not contain any broad
normative principles.2 4 The Supreme Court's application of the doctrine therefore has been anything but exact. Indeed, one commentator has labeled the Court's treatment of the separation of powers
25
doctrine an "incoherent muddle."
In theory, the Constitution prescribes an optimal balance between the competing forces of government.2 6 Through separation of
powers, it promotes values which will ultimately yield a better, more
effective government. Like most constitutional safeguards, however,
the separation of powers doctrine also exacts a price in the form of
governmental inefficiency.2 7 While the doctrine establishes parameters for legislative experimentation and protects against governmental
21
Id. (foomote omitted) (citing Thomas Jefferson, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
120 (W. Peden ed., 1954) and 2 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 400, 404 (H. Syrett &J.

Cooke eds., 1961)).
22

THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 17, at 334.

Brown, supra note 9, at 1521.
Id. at 1521. As Brown explains,
[firom those specifics, the Court must determine the validity of other specific acts not mentioned in the text-as if the eighth amendment did not
prohibit cruel and unusual punishment generally, but specifically outlawed
thumb screws, decapitation, and the rack, leaving the Court to decide
whether the list should include electrocution.
Id. at 1521-22.
25 Id. at 1517; see also Carter, supra note 8, at 721 (arguing that the Court's reasoning
in separation of powers cases lacks analytical coherence); Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARv. L. REy. 105, 127-28 (1988) (noting that the Marison Court, by
upholdingjudicial appointment of independent counsel to investigate alleged wrongdoing
in the executive branch, sounded a sudden retreat from traditional separation of powers
jurisprudence); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489-96 (1987) (asserting that
the court has adopted inconsistent reasoning in separation of powers cases); Paul R.
Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law, and the Idea of IndependencA 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 301, 312 (asserting that the Court is searching for a "sure guide" to separation of
powers cases).
26 See Stephen L. Carter, ConstitutionalImproprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison,
and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. RE,. 357, 366 (1990) ("The entire point of a
constitution that governs structure is to enable government to function while restraining
the ability of government to restructure itself.").
27 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) ("[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution."); id. at 958-59 ("it is crystal clear
that... the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency").
23
24
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abuse, by regulating government it inevitably produces an obstacle to
reform. Thus, when Congress faces a particular problem, the most
effective solution may be unavailable on the grounds that Congress
does not have the power to implement it,28 or because the product of
the contemplated initiative is outside the constitutionally prescribed
bounds. 29 By design, the sacrifice that separation of powers demands
in the short run is justified by its beneficial offerings in the long run:
protection from institutional self-dealing and the preservation of political and individual liberty.30 However, an improperly or excessively
policed doctrine compels unnecessary sacrifice and potential harm.
Therein lies the danger of the current framework.
B.

General Approaches to the Problem

Within the profusion of scholarly commentary addressing the
separation of powers doctrine, there exists two distinct schools of
thought which punctuate the debate: formalism and functionalism.
"Those who espouse the formalist view of separated powers seek judicial legitimacy by insisting upon a firm textual basis in the Constitution for any governmental act."3
Through bright line rules
developed from a literal reading of the constitutional text, formalists
insist upon a strict separation of governmental functions "for the sake
of doctrinal purity'3 2 and determinacy.33 Such emphasis on the plain
meaning of the Constitution inevitably leads to a mechanical applica34
tion of the doctrine.
Formalists assume that government functions are inherently distinguishable and that any exercise of governmental power must therefore comport with the original framework set forth in Articles I, II,
See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (invalidating the legislative veto).
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Independent Counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act is unconstitutional); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act granting budget cutting authority to the Comptroller General).
30 Brown, supra note 9, at 1534.
31
Id. at 1523. See Carter, supra note 25, at 106 (discussing the two strands of separation of powers jurisprudence); Carter, supranote 8 (outlining the evolutionary [functionalist] and de-evolutionary [formalist] theories of separation of powers).
32
Dean Alfange,Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Return to
Normalcy, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 668, 670 (1990); but see id. (arguing that "[t]o insist upon
the maintenance of an absolute separation merely for the sake of doctrinal purity could
severely hinder the quest for 'a workable government' with no appreciable gain for the
cause of liberty or efficiency").
33
See Carter, supranote 26, at 375-76 (arguing that his formal approach will "lead to
relatively determinate answers; that is, different interpreters applying the test in good faith
will tend to reach similar results"; but by contrast, a functional approach "almost inevitably
must lead to balancing, and hence to indeterminacy").
34 See Brown, supra note 9, at 1524-25 ("[Flormalism tends to produce excessively
mechanical results.").
28
29
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and III of the Constitution.3 5 For example, Article II, section 1, clause
1 of the Constitution provides, "The executive power shall be vested in
a President of the United States. '3 6 Justice Scalia, a devout formalist,
has argued that "this does not mean some of the executive power, but
all of the executive Power."37 As Scalia's statement demonstrates, the
formalistic approach assumes that all governmental power may be
characterized as either legislative, executive or judicial. Once characterized, each power may only be exercised by the constitutionally authorized branch.
Formalism encourages judicial activism to thwart legislative initiative in order to preserve the "original understanding."s3 Judicial opinions which incorporate formalism reject any creative government
mechanism without explicit constitutional support.3 9 As government
has grown through legislative delegations of power, Congress has developed unique mechanisms to check those delegations. 40 Such
mechanisms have offended the formalists' perception of government
41
and separation of powers, and have spawned more judicial activism.
For example, the Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto and
rejected the congressional delegation of budget cutting authority to
the Comptroller General. 42
More importantly, under formalist theory, the independent
43
agency presents the most potent threat to the constitutional system.
"[T] he creation of independent administrative agencies.., is considered a violation of the Constitution because such agencies require the
exercise of governmental power in ways that involve an overlap of expressly assigned functions, subject to the control of none of the three

35 Article I, Section 1 reads: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States....." U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 1; Article 2, Section 1 reads: "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1; Article 3, Section 1 reads: "Thejudicial Power of the United States, shall

be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 1.
36 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cI. 1.
37 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38
Carter, supranote 8, at 754. See also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (ScaliaJ., dissenting);

Carter, supra note 25, at 106.
39 See infra part I.E.
40
See infra part I.E; parts I1-III (discussing FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d
821 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); part III.B.2 (discussing Hechinger v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports
Auth., 36 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
41 See infra part I.E.
42
43

See discussions of Bowsher and Chadha infra part I.E.
See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the AdministrativeState 107 HARv.L. REv. 1281,

1281 & n.1 (1994) (arguing that the administrative state is unconstitutional because it is "at
variance with the Constitution's original public meaning").
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branches." 4 4 Additionally, formalists argue that independent agencies
interfere with the President's responsibility for administering all executive powers. 45 In general, formalism views the administrative state as
a constitutionally impermissible threat to presidential power so long
46
as agencies remain beyond presidential oversight.
In contrast to formalism, functionalism is a more permissive doctrine which is concerned with maintaining the proper balance between the coordinate government branches. 47 It rejects formalism as
unnecessary: "[O]ur formal, three-branch theory of government...
cannot describe the government we long have had, is not required by
the Constitution, and is not necessary to preserve the very real and
desirable benefits of 'separation of powers' that form so fundamental
an element of our constitutional scheme." 48 Functionalism suggests
that courts "should view separation-of-powers cases in terms of the impact of challenged arrangements on the balance of power among the
three named [branches].49 The following excerpt portrays the functionalist analytic framework:
[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential
for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within
50
the constitutional authority of Congress.
Functionalism suggests that judicial analysis of the constitutionality of
independent agencies should be both more flexible and more contextual. The Court can only validate independent agencies through a
functional interpretation of separation of powers. As such, independent agencies do not present any constitutional infirmities as long as
the balance of power between the three branches is maintained and
the branches' core functions are preserved. 5 1

44 Brown, supranote 9, at 1524; see alsoHarold H. Bruff, PresidentialPower andAdministrativeRulemaking 88 YALE LJ. 451, 498-99 (1979); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies,
1986 Sup. CT. PE. 41, 54-55.
45 See Carter, supra note 25, at 132.
46
See id. (arguing that Justice Scalia, in his Morrisondissent, should have found independent agencies unconstitutional).
47
See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 578 (1984) (abandoning formalism and adopting an
approach focusing on relationships and interconnections).
48
See Strauss, supranote 25, at 492.
49 See id. at 522.
50 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (citations omitted).
51 See Strauss, supra note 47.
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The Current Supreme Court

The Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence is ideologically impure. That is, the Court has failed to endorse any particular ideology, and has pursued a result oriented form of
decisionmaking. Critics have described the Court's separation of powers decisions as
vacillat[ing] over the years between using a formalistic approach to
separation-of-powers issues grounded in the perceived necessity of
maintaining three distinct branches of government (and consequently appearing to draw rather sharp boundaries), and a functional approach that stresses core function and relationship, and
permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not
52
threatened.
As a result, proponents of both functionalism and formalism can draw
53
upon major Supreme Court decisions to support their positions.
This lack of ideological consistency is a function of the failure of most
members of the Court to unequivocally commit to any of the predominant interpretive theories. 54 Indeed, the Court has been unconcerned with the fact that, ideologically, it continues to reverse itself.55
Additionally, the Court's jurisprudence in this area has been especially unfocused, because the Court has utilized both functionalist and
formalist language within individual opinions.
The Court's difficulty in devising a coherent methodology can be
partially explained by the fact that both functionalism and formalism
contain conceptual flaws. For instance, critics argue that functionalism is utterly ad hoc and fails to provide any interpretative structure.5 6
Justice Scalia, in Monison v. Olson, commented that adoption of functionalism was "an open invitation to experiment." 57 Formalism, on
the other hand, is anachronistic and overly rigid.58 It is completely
dependent upon categorizing government functions. 59
Although both approaches are flawed, only formalism is inapposite to the validation of the independent administrative structure. 60
Strauss, supra note 25, at 489.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (functionalist); Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (functionalist); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (formalist);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (formalist).
54 Matthew J. Tanielian, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court: One Doctrine, Two
Trsions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 971-72 (1995).
55
See Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361; Morrison, 487 U.S. 654; Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714; Chadha,
462 U.S. 919; see also discussion infra parts I.D-E.
56 See Carter, supra note 25, at 127 (criticizing Court for "letting policy, not history"
guide its decision making).
57 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
58 See Strauss, supra note 25, at 489-96.
59
See discussion of Chadha and Bowsher infra part I.E.1.
60
See discussion of formalism supra part I.B.
52

53
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As demonstrated above, independent agencies could not survive scrutiny under a purely formalistic regime. 6 1 Accordingly, to preserve the
independent administrative state, the Court has drawn a distinction
between independence and legislative aggrandizement. 6 2 It has applied a mild functionalism to the former, but a relentless formalism to
the latter.63 Thereby, the Court has acknowledged the propriety and
legitimacy of independent agencies without explicitly endorsing them,
but at the same time it has rejected congressional efforts to carve out
an affirmative role for itself. Although there may be merit in the
Court's argument that legislative initiative should be scrutinized more
carefully, there is no excuse for failing to adopt a coherent methodology to justify the distinction drawn between independence and aggrandizement and the resulting judicial bias against the legislature.
The Court's decision to draw such a distinction can be partially explained by its confusion over the concept of independence. For this
reason, one must first consider what the concept of independence
means within the context of the separation of powers doctrine.
D.

The Concept of Independence under the Separation of
Powers Doctrine

Congress has established independent agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission, which "usually consist of five to
seven members who are appointed [by the President] on a bipartisan
64
basis and serve for a term usually exceeding that of the President."
These agencies possess a varying degree of responsibility which may
include investigative powers, rulemaking authority, litigating authority, and adjudicatory power. 65 The agencies' independence stems
from their commissioners' statutory protection against being removed
at the will of the President.6 6 That is, a President could not influence
an agency by threatening to remove its commissioner.
1.

The Removal Power: Humphrey's Executor, Myers and
Bowsher

Humphrey's Executor v. United States6 7 informs the judicial concept
of independence in administrative law. 68 In Humphrey's, the Supreme
61
62
63
64

See supra part I.B.
See infra part I.E.
See infra part I.E.
Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 Duxa

L.J. 779, 781.
65
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109 (1976) (discussing powers of the Federal
Election Commission).
66 Verkuil, supra note 64, at 781.
67 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
68 Verkuil, supra note 64, at 781.
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Court considered whether the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
stated that "'any commissioner may be removed by the President for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,' 69 improperly
restricted the constitutional power of the President."0 According to
the Court, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) acted "in part quasilegislatively and in part quasi-judicially."171 The Court concluded that
Congress could limit the President's power of removal because
"[s]uch a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm
or an eye of the executive." 7 2 As one commentator observed, "[T] he
Court endorsed the independent agency with a vengeance by rebuffing an effort by [President] Roosevelt to remove an uncooperative
73
commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission."
Humphrey's Executor stands in sharp contrast to Myers v. United
States,74 a Supreme Court case decided nine years earlier in 1926. In
Myers, the Court found that Congress could not limit the President's
removal power over purely executive officers. 75 Myers involved a statute which required the consent of the Senate for the appointment
and removal of the Postmaster General. The Court found that for
Congress to "draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to
remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power...
would be... to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation
of governmental powers." 76 Despite the apparent conflict between
these two cases, Humphrey's Executor distinguished Myers on the
grounds that the latter involved what the Court termed "purely executive powers. ' 77 As mentioned above, the Court in Humphrey's Executor
noted that FTC's powers were both quasijudicial and quasi-legislative.
Thus, Humphrey's Executor leaves open the possibility that an agency
which exercises powers that are not purely executive may be insulated
from the president's discretionary removal power. Humphrey'sExecutor
may therefore be construed as drawing a
sharp line of cleavage between officials who were part of the Executive establishment and were thus removable by virtue of the President's constitutional powers, and those who are members of a body
69 Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 619 (quoting section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 628. In NRA, the district court noted that the FEC was an agency patterned
after the FTC. FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 778 F. Supp. 62, 66 n.2 (D.D.C. 1991),
rev'd 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 115 S.Ct. 537 (1994).
72 Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
73 Verkuil, supranote 64, at 781.
74 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
75 Id. at 161.
76

Id.

77

Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 627-28.
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"to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any
78
other official or any department of the government."
A broad interpretation of Humphrey's Executor could lead to the
conclusion that independent agencies maintain a constitutional status
which is fundamentally different from other government entities. Accordingly, Humphrey's Executor may endorse the independent status of
agencies. 79 However, the Court has never made any effort to clarify its
language in that decision. Moreover, although Humphrey's Executorremains good law, it rests in tension with the more recent opinion of
80
Bowsher v. Synar.
In Bowsher, the Court considered the constitutionality of a provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, that carved out a role for
the comptroller general in balancing the budget.8 ' In order to balance the budget, "the Act set[ ] a 'maximum deficit amount' for federal spending for each of fiscal years 1986 through 1991."82 In the
event that the federal budget deficit in any fiscal year exceeded this
amount, "the Act [compelled] across-the-board cuts in federal spending."8 3 Under the statutory scheme, the Directors of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were to estimate the amount of the federal deficit each
year for the upcoming year.8 4 If the estimate exceeded the target
amount, the Directors would independently calculate the amount of
reductions for each program necessary to achieve the target.8 5 The
Directors would then submit these calculations to the Comptroller
General who would review them and deliver a report to the President.8 6 Finally, the President would "issue a 'sequestration' order
mandating the spending reductions specified by the Comptroller
87
General."
78 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958) (quoting Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at
625-26) (holding that the President did not have the power to remove, at least without
cause, a member of the War Claims Commission).
79 See Carter, supra note 26, at 362 ("UJ]udicial approval of modem administrative
government began in 1935, when the Supreme Court decided in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States that the Congress may create agencies beyond the direction of either the executive or legislative branches.... ."); Verkuil, supra note 64, at 781-82 ("Since the day it was
decided, Humphrey's Executor has shaped judicial understanding of the independence concept in administrative law.").
80 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 734.
Id. at 717.

Id. at 717-18.
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In reviewing this statutory scheme, the Court found the Act unconstitutional.8 8 The Court concluded that because Congress retained removal power, the Comptroller General was an agent of
Congress and was not independent:8 9 "Although the Comptroller
General is nominated by the President. ..and confirmed by the Senate, he is removable only at the initiative of Congress." 90 The Comptroller General could be removed either by impeachment or by joint
resolution of Congress which had to be grounded on a number of
statutorily defined bases. 9 1 Thus, while the Act made the Comptroller
General "one of the most independent officers in the entire federal
establishment, ' 9 2 the Court nevertheless found that he was an agent
of Congress and therefore could not be assigned executive powers. 93
For purposes of this section, Bowsheris significant because it held
that Congress's capacity to remove the Comptroller General made
him an agent of Congress. Thus, while Humphrey's Executor implied
that limited removal power-the ability to exercise removal for cause
as opposed to discretionary removal at will-preserves an agency's independence, Bowsher suggests that such proposition is incorrect. In
this respect, the two opinions are inconsistent with each other. The
Supreme Court in Bowsher implicitly acknowledged this tension when
it defended itself against criticism that the ideology embraced by the
Court challenged the constitutional vitality of the independent agencies. The Court declared:
[N]o issues involving such agencies are presented here. The statutes establishing independent agencies typically specify either that
...

agency members are removable by the President for specified

causes ....This case involves nothing like these statutes, but rather
a statute that provides for direct congressional involvement over the
decision to remove the Comptroller General. Appellants have referred us to no independent agency whose members are removable
88

Id. at 734.
Id. at 732.
90
Id. at 727-28.
91 The Comptroller General "may be removed ... by impeachment [or] by joint
resolution of Congress 'at any time' resting on any one of the following bases: '(i) permanent disability, (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty;, (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or
conduct involving moral turpitude.'" Id. at 728 (quoting 31 U.S.C. §703(e) (1) (B)).
92 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 773 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
93 The Court found that the Comptroller General had exercised executive powers
because the Act gave him "the ultimate authority in determining what budget cuts are to
be made." Id. at 716. According to the Court, "[I]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress
to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law." Id. at
732. But see id. at 751 (Stevens, J.,concurring) (finding the majority's characterization of
the Comptroller-General-assigned powers unconvincing and explaining that "[u]nder...
the analysis adopted by the majority today, it would therefore appear that the function at
issue is 'executive' if performed by the Comptroller General but 'legislative' if performed
by the Congress").
89
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by the Congress for certain causes short of impeachable offenses
94

The Supreme Court's explanation is unpersuasive. If a limited removal power by Congress does not render the Comptroller General
independent of Congress, it is difficult to explain why limited removal
power by the President rendered the Federal Trade Commission in
Humphrey's independent of the President.
Bowsher illuminates the way in which the Supreme Court has dealt
with independent agencies. In a case like Bowsher, the Court will take
a position that ideologically confronts the existence of the independent agencies, but it will inject some unsatisfying language paying homage to the existence of independent agencies to salvage itself. Bowsher
suggests that an agency cannot be considered independent when Congress has limited removal power, but Humphrey's Executortell us that an
agency is independent if the President has a limited removal power.
Herein lies the line between legislative encroachment and independence-if Congress is involved, the Court takes an extreme stance;
otherwise, the Court is more accommodating.
2.

The Appointment Power: Buckley v. Valeo

Removal power is not the only constitutionally controversial aspect of independent agencies; the power to appoint Commissioners of
independent agencies has also been litigated. In Buckley v. Valeo,95 the
Supreme Court concluded that the Appointments Clause of the Constitution requires the President to appoint the members of an independent agency. Buckley involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of the FEC.9 6 At the time of Buckley, FEC members
were appointed in the following manner: Members of Congress appointed four of the six voting Commissioners, and the President appointed the remaining two. 97 All six had to then be confirmed by a
majority of both houses. 98 Moreover, the Secretary of the Senate and
Clerk of the House served ex officio on the Commission, but without
the right to vote. 99
In deciding Buckley, the Supreme Court relied upon the Appointments Clause which states: "[The President] shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... all
other Officers of the United States... "100 The Supreme Court con94
95

Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 n.4.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
96
Id.
97 Id. at 126-27; see Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, § 310, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280-81 (1974) (amended 1976).
98 See § 310, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280-81 (1974).
99 See Id.
100 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
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cluded that the voting members of the FEC were "Officers of the
United States" and therefore could not be appointed by anyone but
the President. 10 1 The Court defined "Officers of the United States" as
anyone "exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States." 10 2 Accordingly, because the duties of the FEC's members included executive agency functions, Congress could not appoint
any of its voting members. 03
Interestingly, the Supreme Court's review has so far been limited
to questions concerning the mechanics of the independent agency
structure such as the appointment and removal powers. The Court
has never considered the constitutionality of an agency's very existence. In other words, the Supreme Court has not considered the
extent to which an entity may be insulated from executive control and
simultaneously exercise executive powers. Some courts, including the
D.C. Circuit in NRA, have relied upon Morrison v. Olson'0 4 to conclude
that independent agencies can indeed perform executive functions
without running afoul of the Constitution. 10 5
3.

Independence: Morrison v. Olson

In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court considered whether the
establishment of an Independent Counsel under the Ethics in Government Act was constitutional. 10 6 The Act bestowed upon an Independent Counsel the "full power and independent authority to
exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of
the . . . Attorney General[ ] and . .. the Department of Justice" to
investigate the President and other Executive officials who have allegedly been involved in criminal activity. 10 7 In the wake of Watergate
and President Nixon's firing of the special prosecutors assigned to investigate his culpability, Congress thought it necessary to create an
Independent Counsel to investigate executive wrongdoing free from
presidential control.' 0 8 Under the Act, the Attorney General can re-

move an Independent Counsel only for "good cause."' 0 9 And, if the
101

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
Id.
103 Id. at 139-40.
104 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
105
See, e.g., FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
("Although appellants have standing to assert that the [FEC] ... acts unconstitutionally
because of its independence of the President in its law enforcement activities, there is not
much vitality to the claim after Morrison v. Olson."), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994).
106 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
107 Id. at 662 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)).
108 KArJ. HARIRGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE 47 (1992).
109 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596 (a) (1)).
102
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Attorney General chooses to remove an Independent Counsel, the
Court of Appeals must review that decision.110
A majority of the Court found that the Act did not violate the
Constitution for two reasons. First, although the functions performed
by the Independent Counsel are purely "executive," the restrictions
placed upon removal did not impermissibly interfere with the President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed investigative and
prosecutorial functions."' Because the Independent Counsel possesses limited jurisdiction and tenure, the Court could not see how
the President's need to control the Independent Counsel's exercise of
discretion was so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as
to require as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will.1 1 2 Moreover, the Court found that the "good cause" removal standard provided the President through the Attorney General
with ample authority to assure that the Independent Counsel competently performs his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that
comports with the provisions of the Act." 3 Second, the Court found
that the Act did not unduly interfere with the role of the Executive
Branch and therefore did not violate the principle of separation of
powers. 1 4 The Court distinguished Bowsher, noting that "this case...
[did] not involve an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at
115
the expense of the Executive Branch."
Like the Independent Counsel, independent agencies are entities
separate from the President. Because Mo0ison limited its focus to the
status of the Independent Counsel, it did not end the debate over the
validity of independent agencies. Nevertheless, the decision serves as
another arrow in the quiver of those who believe independent agencies satisfy constitutional muster. 116 And although Morrison's functional approach characterizes the way in which courts have treated
independent actors, the Court has been much more sensitive to instances of legislative aggrandizement. This distinction between independence and legislative aggrandizement, and its consequential bias
against Congress is analyzed in the next section.

110
I1I
112
113
114
115

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

663-64 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (3)).
692-93.
692.
695-96.
694.

116 In NRAJudge Silberman noted that after Morrisonone could not successfully argue
that the FEC, or any other independent agency, acted unconstitutionally because of its
independence of the President. FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct 537 (1994); see also supra note 105.
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Open Hostility to Congress-Drawing the Distinction between
Independence and Aggrandizement

The distinction drawn between independence and aggrandizement evolved from the major separation of powers cases of the 1980's
such as Bowsher, Chadha, Morrison, and Mistretta.n 7 Throughout these
cases, the Court permitted Congress to establish administrative agencies independent of the President and thereby diminish the breadth
of executive power. But, the Court has consistently refused Congress
any expansive role within the administrative state. 11 8 Although the
Court has not engaged in any real analysis of the constitutionality of
independent agencies, it has excessively policed congressional activity
within the administrative realm, thereby constitutionalizing an extreme bias against the legislative branch. The Court first articulated
this jurisprudential bias against Congress in two seminal separation of
powers cases: Chadha"9 and Bowsher.120 In the subsequent cases of
Morrison12 1 and Mistretta,122 the Court distinguished this bias from the
concept of independence.
1. Impermissible Aggrandizement: Chadha and Bowsher
In INS v. Chadha,123 the Court dealt a significant blow to Congressional power through its blanket rejection of the legislative veto.
Before Chadha, the legislative veto had existed in a wide variety of statutory realms. 12 4 In the era of modem government, Congress has
made broad delegations to the President and to administrative agencies. 12 5 It developed the legislative veto as a useful mechanism to
check these broad delegations of power. 12 6 For example, the Con117

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (finding the U.S. Sentencing

Commission constitutional); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (finding the Independent Counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act constitutional); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
granting budget cutting authority to the Comptroller General); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto).
118

See supra note 117.

119
120
121
122
123

462
478
487
488
462

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

919
714
654
361
919

(1983).
(1986).
(1988).
(1989).
(1983).

124 Id. at 968 (WhiteJ, dissenting) ("The device is known in every field of governmental concern: reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war powers, and regulation of trade,
safety, energy, the environment and the economy.").
125
See generally CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRrr LAw AND MAKE POLICY 7-20 (1994) (discussing the magnitude of delegated authority

granted to agencies beginning with the New Deal); Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in
HistoricalPerspective 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1986) (examining judicial responses to each
successive wave of federal regulatory change).
126

See PETER L. STRAUSS ET At,

GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND

COMMENTS 160 (9th ed. 1995) ("As agency rulemaking became increasingly important as a
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gressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 provided
that "temporary impoundments [of appropriations by the President]
27
... would become effective unless disapproved by one House."
Supporters of the Act hailed it as an "indispensable political invention
that allows the President and Congress to resolve major constitutional
and policy differences, assures the accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress's control over
28
lawmaking."
Chadhainvolved a challenge to the validity of the legislative veto,
as provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act. In that case, the
Court held that the legislative veto in section 244(c) (2) of the Act
violated the separation of powers principle and was therefore unconstitutional. 129 The Act empowered the Attorney General with discretionary authority to suspend the deportation of an otherwise
deportable alien by submitting to Congress "a complete and detailed
statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law ... with the
reasons for such suspension."'u 0 In section 244(c) (2) of the Act, however, Congress retained the power to "veto" the Attorney General's
decision by a resolution from either House of Congress. 13 1 If Congress exercised its veto, the deportation proceedings would continue.
If Congress did not act within its next two sessions, the Attorney Gen132
eral would cancel the deportation proceedings.
In the instant case, the INS had ordered Chadha, an alien whose
student visa had expired, to show cause why he should not be deported. 133 Chadha conceded that he was deportable but applied for a
suspension.' 34 After a hearing in front of an Immigration Judge, his
deportation was suspended. 135 A year and a half later, the House of
Representatives exercised its veto power by passing a resolution reregulatory form, use of the legislative veto became more frequent.... .");James Abourezk,
The CongressionalVeto: A ContemporaryResponse to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. Rav. 323, 324 (1977). According to Abourezk:
Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as
follows: from 1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49,
nineteen statutes; ...

and from 1960-69, forty nine. From the year 1970

through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions were included in eighty-nine laws.
Id.
127
128

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 971 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 972-73.

129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at 956-59.
Id. at 924-25.
Id. at 925.
Id.
Id. at 923.
Id.

135
Id. at 924. The INS is administered by the Department of Justice, an entity controlled by the Attorney General.
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jecting the suspension order.'8 6 Chadha challenged this action as violating the separation of powers principle of the Constitution. 137 The
Supreme Court responded by invalidating all forms of the legislative
38
veto.'
Chadhaembodies an extremely formal and mechanical reading of
the Constitution. In its decision, the Court concluded that all legislative activity must conform to procedures articulated in the Presentment Clauses 139 as well as the bicameral requirement. 140 The
Presentment Clauses provide:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the
President of the United States ....141
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary... shall
be presented to the President ...and before the Same shall take
effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall
be reposed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representa-

tives

....142

The bicameral requirement of Article I, sections 1 and 7 dictates that
no law can take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the members of both Houses. 143 Accordingly, the Court
found the legislative veto constitutionally inadequate because it did
not conform to the presentment and bicameral requirements. 4 4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first demonstrated that the
veto was legislative in character and was therefore governed by Article
I. The Court found that section 244(c) (2) was "essentially legislative
in purpose and in effect" because it "alter[ed] the legal rights, duties,
and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive
Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch."' 45
Thus, the legislative veto satisfied the Court's definition of
14 6
legislation.
Id. at 927-28.
Id. at 928.
138 Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, noted that "[t]he Court's decision...
apparently will invalidate every use of the legislative veto." Id. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring). Donald Elliott too has noted that "only days after Chadha, the Court affirmed summarily two decisions declaring legislative vetoes unconstitutional in circumstances arguably
distinguishable from Chadha" Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, The Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 127.
139
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3.
140
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cl.
2.
141 U.S. CONST.art. I, § 7, cI. 2.
142
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cI. 3.
143 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7.
144 Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-59.
136
137

145
146

Id. at 952.
Id.
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Further, and with little explanation, the Court assumed that separation of powers mandated that the bicameral requirement and the
Presentment Clauses be necessary checks upon all Congressional activity. 1 47 However, the need for such checks is not as apparent as the

majority assumed. Justice White pointed out that "[i]f Congress may
delegate lawmaking power to independent and Executive agencies, it
is most difficult to understand Article I as prohibiting Congress from
also reserving a check on legislative power for itself."148
The Chadha Court's disregard forJustice White's point reflects a
judicial bias against legislative initiative. Indeed, there are other institutional actors, such as the Attorney General under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, who engage in activity that resembles lawmaking
but are not scrutinized in the way that the Chadha Court treated Congress. 149 This inconsistency exposes the judicial bias against Congress.
In its brief to the Court, Congress questioned this approach by asking
why the Attorney General, who is authorized to suspend deportation
under the Act, should be "exempt from submitting his proposed
changes in the law to the full bicameral process."' 5 0 Certainly, the Act
empowers the Attorney General to alter the rights of an alien by suspending deportation. From the Court's reasoning, it would follow
that this activity would be subject to Article I procedures.
In response to Congress, the Court concluded that "[t]he bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach
It is clear, therebeyond the limits of the statute that created it....
fore, that the Attorney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity ... ."151 Without this language, the Chadha opinion would have
undermined the legitimacy of administrative rulemaking because
when agencies make rules, an activity that resembles lawmaking, these
rules are not passed by both houses and then presented to the President. 15 2 However, if, as the Court's language suggests, the bicameral
147 Indeed, as the Court noted, "[t]here are four provisions in the Constitution, explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the unreviewable force of
law, not subject to the President's veto .... " Id. at 955 (footnote omitted). These include
the House of Representative's impeachment power; the Senate's power to conduct trials
following impeachment; the Senate's unreviewable power to approve or to disapprove
Presidential appointments; and the Senate's unreviewable power to ratify treaties. Id.
148 Id. at 986 (White, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 988-89 (White, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 953 n.16.
151 Id.
152 An agency, authorized to make rules must conform its rulemaking to the organic
statute creating the agency and to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA). According to the APA, "[Rule means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy...." 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (1994). According to Cornelius M. Kerwin, "The rules
issued by... agencies.., are law; they carry the same weight as congressional legislation,
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process is only necessary for congressional activity, agencies do not
need to comply with Article I. Chadha, therefore, represents one of
the Court's initial attempts to thwart legislative initiative through a
formal reading of the text without threatening the administrative
state.
Writing for the Chadhamajority, Justice Burger defended his position with a classic separation of powers defense. Justice Burger wrote:
"The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish
desirable objectives, must be resisted.' u5 3 He made this assertion despite the dissent's claim that "[t] he history of the legislative veto...
makes clear that it has not been a sword with which Congress has
struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches
.*..1154 Justice Burger's reasoning therefore demonstrates that the

Court is unwilling to engage in any real contextual analysis of congressional power.
Bowsher v. Syna7' 55 is another formalistic opinion which exposes a
similar weakness in the Court's reasoning. As discussed above, the
Bowsher Court found the provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act, which bestowed upon the Comptroller General an affirmative
role in the budget process, unconstitutional. 5 6 In Bowsher, Justice
White argued in dissent that the Court's decision is based on a syllogism: The Act vests the "Comptroller with 'executive power'; such
power may not be exercised by Congress or its agents; the Comptroller is an agent of Congress because he is removable by Congress;
57
therefore the Act is invalid."'
The Court's formalistic reasoning further illuminates the judiciary's bias against Congress. First, this is demonstrated by the extent to
which Bowsher clashes with Humphrey's Executor.158 Whereas Humphrey's
Executor suggests that limited removal means independence, the logic
of Bowsher contradicts this proposition. Under Bowsher, anytime Congress retains removal power, the implicated agency can never be considered independent under the separation of powers doctrine. The
Court's analysis of removal power suggests that the Court is free to
apply a different and heightened standard to congressional relationships than to others because the "dangers of congressional usurpation
presidential executive orders, and judicial decisions.... Rulemaking occurs when agencies use the legislative authority granted them by Congress." KERWIN, supra note 125, at 4.
153 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
154 Id. at 974 (White, J., dissenting).
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Id. at 717-19 (1986); For a detailed discussion of Bowsher, see supraparts I.D.1, I.E.1.
Id. at 765 (White, J., dissenting).
158 For a more extensive discussion of the conflict between Humphrey's Executor and
Bowsher, see supra part I.D.1.
155

156
157
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of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized."' 59 The
Court continues by suggesting that this decision is supported by debates at the Constitutional Convention and by the Federalist
60
Papers.
Second, the Court's prejudice against Congress is demonstrated
in an analogy it makes to Chadha:
To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws
would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress
could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress.
This kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws,
6
Chadha makes clear is constitutionally impermissible.' 1
Thus, "because Congress has retained removal authority over the
Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with executive
62
powers."']
Chadha and Bowsher suggest that legislative aggrandizement is a
threat that should be policed aggressively and with acute sensitivity.
The Court operates under the assumption that Congress cannot be
effectively restrained by the internal checks of the system. A broad
reading of these decisions suggests that Congress cannot exercise any
control over executive powers and that anything it does must conform
to the legislative process. As noted above, the Court complimented
this activist stance with formalistic language. Although the Court limited its opinions to congressional control over administrative agencies,
its language can be interpreted as questioning the validity of independent agencies themselves. However, when confronted with
truly independent actors in later cases, the Court compromised its
prior positions in order to carve out a politically necessary exception.
This endeavor is portrayed in Morrison and Mistretta.
2.

The Supreme Court's Acceptance of Independent Actors: Morrison
and Mistretta

In Morrison v. Olson,' 63 the Supreme Court considered whether
the establishment of an Independent Counsel under the Ethics in
Government Act was constitutionally permissible. In finding the provision of Independent Counsel constitutional, the Court employed a
methodology markedly different from that used in Bowsher, Chadha,
'59

Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727.

Id. ("'The debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are
replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government
will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.'") (alteration in original)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976)).
161
Id. at 726-27.
162 Id. at 732.
163 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
160
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and other separation of powers cases. In contrast to Bowsher and
Chadha, Morrison represents a "stunning setback" to those who
thought that the Court had committed itself to formalism in separation of power cases.1 64 Moreover, under the facts of Morrison, the
Court could no longer disregard the existence of independent agencies as it had in prior decisions. The Independent Counsel mirrors
the structure of the independent agencies to the extent that, in both
cases, the President has limited removal power. 165 If the Court had
found the Independent Counsel Provision to be unconstitutional, it
would have been difficult to have avoided a more general indictment
166
of independent agencies.
Whereas Bowsher and Chadha may be characterized as opinions
"championing the original understanding,"' 67 Morrison represents a
more pragmatic and functional result. To explain the differences in
methodologies, Professor Stephen Carter argued that because the
Court's "analytic method" revealed in Bowsher "came into conflict with
...the legitimation and preservation of the independent agencies,"16 8
it embraced a more functional methodology to achieve that result. It
is clear that the Court recognized its awkward shift. The Court conceded that "it is undeniable that the Act reduces the amount of control or supervision that the . . . President exercises over the
investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity." 16 9 In order to harmonize its separation of powers jurisprudence, the Court held that "this case does not involve an attempt by
Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive
Branch.... [It] does not pose a 'danger of congressional usurpation
of Executive Branch functions."17 0
In reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored the lower court's
finding that "if the President's authority is diminished-and we think
it utterly impossible to deny that the Act accomplishes at least that
result-Congress's political power must necessarily increase vis-4-vis
the President." 17 Moreover, the Court did not think it significant
that the "Act does empower certain Members of Congress to request
the Attorney General to apply for the appointment of an independent
164 See supra part ll.E.2. Chadha and Bowsher employ a formal interpretation of the
separation of powers principle. In contrast, Morrison relies upon a functional approach.
165
Carter, supra note 26, at 361.
166
Carter, supra note 25, at 132 (arguing that Scalia's dissent implicitly finds independent agencies unconstitutional).
167
Carter, supra note 25, at 106.
168
Id.
169
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695.
170
Id. at 694.
171
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988).
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counsel." 172 The Supreme Court determined that there was a clear
distinction between Congress's role in Bowsher and its role in relation
73
to the Independent Counsel.'
Mistretta v. United States' 74 completes this quartet of Supreme
Court cases. In Mistretta, the Court held that Congress may establish
the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an independent agency and may
grant it the authority to establish sentencing guidelines binding upon
federal judges.' 75 The Act established an "independent commission
in the judicial branch."1 76 As constituted, the Commission has seven
voting members, all of whom are appointed by the President. At least
three of these members must be federal judges selected from a list of
six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference
of the United States.177 Mistretta argued that "Congress in constituting the Commission as it did, effected an unconstitutional accumulation of power within the Judicial Branch while at the same time
undermining the Judiciary's independence and integrity." 178 In other
words, Mistretta argued that Congress could not constitutionally require Article III judges to exercise legislative authority through the
making of sentencing policy. Mistretta further claimed that the Sentencing Commission upset the balance mandated by the principles of
separation of powers. 179 Mistretta apparently envisioned a more formal separation of powers.
Despite the enormous delegation of power to an independent
agency, there was no suggestion in Mistretta that Congress had reserved any power for itself. Thus, the case did not implicate "the particular danger of the Legislative Branch's accreting to itselfjudicial or
executive power,"' 8 0 and the Court adopted a "flexible understanding
of separation of powers." 18 Although the Court recognized the danger presented by "the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other,"18 2 it determined that the Sentencing Commission was located within a constitutionally recognized
"'twilight area' in which the activities of the separate Branches
merge." 1 3 For that reason, the Court found it was unnecessary to
172
173
174

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694.
Id.
488 U.S. 361 (1988).

175

Id. at 412.

176

Id. at 368.
Id.

177
178

179
180

181
182

183

Id. at 383.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 382.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 386.
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characterize, as it did in Bowsherand Chadha, the specific nature of the
84
powers exercised by the Commission.'
The Court's justification for its position demonstrates its preference for adhering to the distinction it has drawn. It defended Mistretta by showing that although it has "invalidated attempts by
Congress to exercise the responsibilities of other Branches," it has
"upheld statutory provisions that to some degree commingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment."' 8 5 In the absence of either aggrandizement
or encroachment, the Court does not feel compelled to adopt a formalist approach. Thus, one could infer from Mistretta that, although
separation of powers is a flexible doctrine, that flexibility does not
apply to Congress. Arguably, the interpretive mode employed by the
Court has become a substitute for the separation of powers doctrine
itself. This became apparent in Metropolitan WashingtonAirports Author86
ity v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise.'
3.

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise

The Court has aggressively enforced the analytical framework
outlined in the preceding Part. For example, in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise
(CAAN), Congress authorized the transfer of operating control of National and Dulles Airports from the Department of Transportation to
s7 It is imthe Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA)
portant to note that the MWAA is not a federal entity and that Congress merely authorized its creation.' 8 8 In addition, the established
statutory scheme permitted MWAA's Board of Directors to create a
Board of Review composed of nine expert members of Congress, chosen from a list submitted jointly by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate. 8 9 A member
of Congress could satisfy the expertise requirement by having served
on one of a number of listed congressional committees.' 9 0 The legislation envisioned that these members of Congress would serve "'in
their individual capacities, as representatives of users' of airports."' 9 '
184

Id. at 387 n.14.

185

Id. at 382.

186

501 U.S. 252 (1991).
Id. at 255.

187

188
Id. at 258. In 1985, Virginia and the District of Columbia both passed legislation
authorizing the establishment of the regional authority. Id.

189

Id. at 261.

190

Id. at 261 n.5.
Id. at 267 (quoting 49 U.S.C. App. § 2456(f) (1)).

191
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Moreover, the Board of Review was given veto power over decisions
192
made by the Board of Directors.
In a tortured interpretation of separation of powers, the Court
found that this arrangement violated separation of powers principles. 193 The Court found that the Board's exercise of federal power
implicated the separation of powers doctrine notwithstanding the lack
of any threat to the established balance of power among the federal
branches.19 4 In particular, the Court's finding that federal power was
involved is a strained interpretation. 195 The MWAA is a body created
by state law; its authority derives from acts passed by Virginia and the
District of Columbia. 196 Nonetheless, the majority justified its position on the grounds that control over the airports was originally in
federal hands; 19 7 that the federal government has a strong and continuing interest in the efficient operation of the airports;19 8 and that
membership on the board is limited to federal officials. 199 The Board
of Review would not have existed but for Congress, but that does not
mean that Congress's role makes the MWAA a federal entity. As Justice White noted in dissent, "Constitutional text and history leave no
question but that Virginia and the District of Columbia could constitutionally agree to pass reciprocal legislation creating a body by which
nonfederal officers would appoint Members of Congress functioning
20 0
in their individual capacities."
In addition, the Court's holding that the Board was a congressional agent is somewhat attenuated. The Court reasoned that because the Act provided that the Board of Review shall consist of
members with experience on related congressional committees which
are chosen from a list submitted by the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House, it "guarantee [d] Congress effective control over appointments. '20 1 Once the Court characterized the
arrangement in this manner, it could conclude that, under Bowsher,
the power of removal made the Board of Review a congressional
agent. 20 2 Even if the Court was correct, its logic is thin. The fact that
192

Id.

193

Id. at 276-77.

Id. ("Congress imposed its will on the regional authority ...by means ... that
might prove to be innocuous. However, the statutory scheme... provides a blueprint for
extensive expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitutionally confined role.").
195 In dissent, Justice White noted that this decision was the first time in history that
the Court had employed separation of powers doctrine to invalidate a body created under
state law. Id. at 278 (White, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (White, J, dissenting).
197 Id. at 266.
198 Id.
199
Id. at 267.
200 Id. at 283 (White, J., dissenting).
201
Id. at 269.
202
Id. at 270.
194
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the members of the Board are chosen from a list submitted by Congress does not give Congress extraordinary control over the appointment process. In fact, Congress has often placed notable restrictions
2 03
on appointments to a wide range of government offices.
Finally, it appears that the Court could not determine whether
the power exercised by the MWAA was executive or legislative. 20 4 The
Court concluded that "if the power is executive, the Constitution does
not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism
and presentment requirements of Art. I."205
CAAN demonstrates how the Court has constitutionalized an extreme bias towards Congress in matters that involve the structural elements of the Constitution. The Court found that although the
scheme in CAAN "might prove to be innocuous . .. [it] provides a
blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power beyond its
constitutionally confined role. ' 20 6 The Court based its conclusion on
the observations of James Madison that the legislature "'can with
greater facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures, the
encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.' 20 7
Thus, CAANindicates that the Court, in its constitutional capacity, has
endorsed a judicial paranoia of the legislature. Under the Court's
analysis, many innocuous schemes might be interpreted as providing
blueprints for unconstitutional activity. Although the Court did not
articulate a presumption of invalidity against Congress, its language
borders on such. Without reference to Congress's actual influence
under the statutory relationship, the Court finds that to dispense with
the case, it need not do anything more than invoke James Madison's
cautionary observation regarding legislative power. In short, the
Court's lack of concern for Congress's actual lack of control suggests
203 See e.g. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410 n.31 (1988) (demonstrating
that the Court was not bothered by Congress's power to require the President to appoint
three federal judges to the Sentencing Commission after considering a list of six judges
recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 727 (1986) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court was not troubled by the fact that
the Comptroller General was nominated by the President from a list of three individuals
recommended by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate);
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding the FECA
requirement that "no more than 3 members of the Commission... may be affiliated with
the same political party" constitutional), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994).
204 CAAN, 501 U.S. at 276. The D.C. Circuit had found that the power exercised by the
Board of Review over "key operational decisions is quintessentially executive." Id. The
Supreme Court found that it did not need to "agree or disagree with this characterization
by the Court of Appeals to conclude that the Board of Review's power is constitutionally
impermissible." Id.
205 Id.
206
Id. at 277.
207
Id. (quoting THE FEDERAUSST No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
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that contextual analysis is unnecessary in cases involving congressional
activity. CAAN is alarming because it furthers the notion that the
Court has a proclivity for invalidating every remotely questionable legislative initiative.
For those justices inclined to use formalistic methodology, CAAN
was an easy case in the sense that they did not have to worry about the
opinion conflicting with the independent agencies as did the Chadha
and BowsherCourts. 20 8 CAANpresented a unique opportunity to advocate a formalistic assault upon Congress without any cautionary language. Furthermore, it has inspired lower courts such as the D.C.
Circuit in the NRA case to extend the bias against Congress even further than CAAN, Bowsher, or Chadha. In particular, NRA is unique in
that it is the first case to apply CAANs bias to a review of the relationship between Congress and an independent agency. For this reason,
the remainder of this Note focuses upon FEC v. NtRA Political Victory
20 9
Fund.
II
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSfssION v
VICTORY FUND

A.

UR

POLITICAL

Introduction

In FEC v. NRA PoliticalVictory Fund,2 10 the D.C. Circuit found that
the composition of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) violated
the constitutional principle of separation of powers, because in addition to six voting members appointed by the President, the Secretary
of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives served as
ex officio nonvoting members of the Commission.21 ' The court of
appeals found that "the mere presence of agents of Congress on an
entity with executive powers offends the Constitution."2 12 For this reason, NRA represents the greatest extension of the constitutional bias
against Congress to date.
The FEC was established under the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA)2 1 3 as an independent agency authorized to regulate elections and campaign finance.2 1 4 It was "created in the wake of Watergateout [sic] of a concern about corruption and abuses in campaign
See supra part I.E.1.
6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994).
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 827.
213
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1280-88 (1974)
(current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994)).
214
Id.
208
209
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finance." 2 15 Congress removed civil enforcement of the campaign financing statutes from the Department ofJustice because it feared that
enforcement would otherwise be subject to the partisan influence of
the President, and entrusted it to the FEC, an independent, nonpartisan agency.2 16 Generally the FEC's powers fall into three categories.
First, the Commission exercises powers of an investigative or informative nature.2 17 Second, the Commission perfonns functions such as
rulemaking, rendering advisory opinions, and formulating general
policy in the area of campaign finance.2 18 Third, the Commission is
entrusted with exclusive jurisdiction over civil enforcement of
FECA.2 19 Jurisdiction over criminal prosecution remains with the De22 0
partment of Justice.
B.

Buckley v. Valeo

NRA is not the first case to challenge the composition of the FEC.
As discussed above, the seminal separation of powers case, Buckley v.
Valeo,22 1 found the FEC unconstitutional and ordered Congress to
restructure the Commission.2 22 At the time of Buckley, members of
Congress nominated four of the six voting Commissioners of the FEC,
and the President nominated the remaining two.2 2 3 All six nominees
2 24
then had to be confirmed by a majority of both houses of Congress.
The Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House served as ex officio members without the right to vote.2 25 In Buckley, the Court
215 FederalElectionCommission PanelDiscussion:Problems and Possibilities,8 AnMrN. LJ.228
(1994). In June 1974, the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities,
otherwise known as the Watergate Committee, issued its final report which included a
recommendation that there should be established an independent nonpartisan Federal
Election Commission. S. REP. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 564 (1974). The Committee
wrote:
Probably the most significant reform that could emerge from the Watergate
scandal is the creation of an independent, nonpartisan agency to supervise
the enforcement of the laws relating to the conduct of elections. Such a
body-given substantial investigatory and enforcement powers-could not
only help ensure that misconduct would be prevented in the future, but
that investigations of alleged wrongdoing would be vigorous and conducted
with the confidence of the public.
Id. at 564.
216 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1280-88
(1974).
217 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109 (1976).
218 2 U.S.C. § 437(d) (1994) (outlining the powers of the commission).
219 See 2 U.S.C. § 437(g) (1994).
220 See id.
221 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
222 See supra part I.D.2.
223 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, 1281
(1974).

224
225

Id.
Id.
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found that only the President could appoint "Officers of the United
States," 226 which it defined as anyone "exercising significant authority
pursuant to laws of the United States." 227 Accordingly, because the
duties of the FEC's members included executive agency functions, the
Court held that Congress could not appoint any of the Commission's
voting members.2 28 Buckley differs from N-RA and many other cases
discussed in this note in that it relies upon explicit textual provisions
of the Constitution. Buckley's separation of powers analysis focuses
upon the Appointments Clause in Article I.
After being rebuffed in Buckley, Congress restructured the FEC so
that by the time NRA was filed, the Commission was composed of:
"[T] he Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives ... ex officio and without the right to vote, and 6 members
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate."2 29 In NRA, the NRA successfully argued that despite this reconstitution, the FEC's composition continued to be constitutionally
infirm.
C.

The NRA Case

NRA involved the FEC's 1990 decision to file a civil enforcement
suit against the NRA, alleging that the organization violated FECA
230
when it transferred $415,744.72 to the NRA Political Victory Fund.
The FEC's decision to bring charges came after a majority of its six
voting members found that there was "reason to believe" that the NRA
had made illegal campaign contributions.2 3 1 The NRA raised affirmative defenses challenging the constitutional status of the FEC and argued that these constitutional deficiencies barred the Commission
from filing this action.2 3 2 The district court, in an opinion authored
by Judge Stanley Sporkin, rejected the NRA's affirmative defenses and
held that the payment at issue was "an illegal contribution in violation
2 33
of the FECA."
The NRA, in a summary judgment motion, challenged the FEC's
validity on three constitutional grounds. First, it claimed that "the
statutory scheme for appointing Commissioners infringes on the presidential appointment power granted in the Constitution because the
See The Appointments Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
228
Id. at 140.
229 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (1) (1994).
230 FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 778 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd 6 F.d
821 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994).
231
Brief for FEC at 9, FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994) (No.
93-1151).
232 See NRA, 778 F. Supp. at 65.
226

227

233

Id.
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President is prevented from appointing more than three Commissioners from the same political party." Second, the NRA argued that "because the Commissioners cannot be controlled or removed by the
President, execution of the laws is being entrusted to someone other
than the President, who under Article II is to have the sole executive
power. ''23 4 This argument, in effect, challenged the constitutionality
of independent agencies in general. Finally, and most important, the
NRA claimed that there was a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine because the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House sat on the commission as nonvoting ex officio members. 23 5
The NRA claimed that these members were agents of Congress and
that their presence allowed Congress to unconstitutionally influence
23 6
the exercise of executive powers.
The district court denied the NRA's standing to raise these challenges because "[a]ny attempt to show that defendants' interests have
been harmed by the statutory appointment scheme for the FEC would
be speculative at best" and "any claim that the presence of non-voting
ex officio members of the FEC has harmed defendant's interests is
equally speculative." 2 37 According to the district court, only the President's interests were affected and therefore "it is the President and
not the NRA who can challenge alleged infringements of presidential
powers." 238 Thus, the district court denied the NRA's motion for summary judgment and ordered the organization to pay the assessed
239

penalty.

Judge Sporkin noted in dicta that the FEC's nonvoting members
240
had "no real say in the outcome of any Commission proceedings"
and that to declare the FEC unconstitutional because of their presence would be an "excessive remedy."2 41 In addition, the district
court dismissed the NRA's general attack on the constitutionality of
independent agencies by noting that independent agencies such as
the FEC have "functioned admirably for decades" and therefore de24 2
serve a "presumption of regularity."
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and declared that the NRA did have standing to raise its affirmative defenses. 24 3 In its reversal, the circuit court found that the only
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Id. at 65.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id.

241

Id.

242

Id. at 65 n.2.

243

NRA, 6 F.Sd at 824.
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substantial claim raised by the defendants concerned the status of the
nonvoting ex officio members. 2 44 The court did not find the NRA's
other arguments persuasive.2 45 Writing for the court, Judge Silberman found that the Constitution prohibits Congress from placing its
agents "'beyond the legislative sphere' by naming them to membership on an entity with executive powers." 246 Relying upon this constitutional infirmity, the D.C. Circuit found that the FEC did not have
24 7
authority to bring the enforcement action against the NRA.

Notably, the opinion held only that the FEC could not prosecute
the particular claim against the NRA. The court did not order the
FEC to reconstitute itself 2 48 As a matter of practice, however, absent
reconstitution, future FEC enforcement actions brought in the D.C.
Circuit would be dismissed based on the stare decisis effect of NRA.
The FEC could conceivably have avoided this prohibitive effect by
bringing an enforcement action in another circuit 249 because Con2 50
gress was not required, as it was after Buckley, to amend the statute.
However, four days after the D.C. Circuit's ruling, the Commission
voted to reconstitute itself as a six-member agency without ex officio
members at least until the Supreme Court had an opportunity to review the D.C. Circuit's position. 251 The reconstituted Commission
then proceeded to ratify or reconsider its prior determinations in cur2 52
rent investigations and enforcement actions.
What makes this case remarkable is that the ex officio members
possessed no statutory authority to exercise FEC powers and no other
ability to assert actual control. 255 The Act effectively precluded the ex
officio members from controlling the decisionmaking process. That
is, because voting is the only mechanism through which the Commis244

Id. at 826.

First, the court found that the "challenge to the alleged restriction on the President's appointment power to select more than three commissioners from one party is not
justiciable." Id. at 824. Second, the court found that "[a]lthough appellants have standing
to assert that the Commission acts unconstitutionally because of its ... law enforcement
activities, there is not much vitality to the claim after Morrison." Id. at 826.
246
Id. at 827.
247
Id. at 822.
248
In addition, given that FECA contains a severability clause, see 2 U.S.C. § 454 (1994)
("If any provision of this Act... is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act
shall not be affected thereby."), the court did not feel compelled to order Congress to
amend the statute. NRA, 6 F.3d at 828.
249
See, e.g., FEC v. Williams, No. CV 93-06321-ER (C.D. Cal.Jan. 31, 1995) (Order Re:
Cross-Motions for SummaryJudgment) (holding that the presence of nonvoting ex officio
members of the FEC was not unconstitutional).
250
NRA, 6 F.3d at 828.
251
Brief for FEC at 13, FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S.Ct. 537 (1994) (No.
93-1151).
252
Id.
255
2 U.S.C. section 437(c) (1994).
245
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sioners administer FEC authority,2 5 4 the Act ensures that the presence

of the ex officio members is ineffectual. Additionally, the Act does
not permit either of these members to serve as chairmen of the commission.2 55 Moreover, the ex officio members could not call or ad2 56
journ a meeting and were not counted in determining a quorum.
The statute empowered the ex officio members to do nothing more
than give advice and express their views to the voting Commissioners
during FEC meetings.2 5 7 Notwithstanding its concession that the ex
officio members occupied an advisory role at best, the court found
that "[a] dvice, however, surely implies influence, and Congress must
limit the exercise of its influence, whether in the form of advice or
not, to its legislative role." 25 8 The court made the following revealing
statement:
[W]e cannot conceive why Congress would wish or expect its officials to serve as ex officio members if not to exercise some influence.
Even if the ex officio members were to remain completely silent during all deliberations... their mere presence as agents of Congress
conveys a tacit message to the other commissioners. The message
may well be an entirely appropriate one-but it nevertheless has the
25 9
potential to influence the other commissioners.
In its decision, the court, "for purposes of constitutional analysis," refused to draw any distinctions between voting and nonvoting members of the FEC.2 60 The court recognized that the ex officio members
did not have statutory authority to exercise FEC powers, but it found
that Congress could exercise a level of influence sufficient to produce
a threat of constitutional proportions.2 61 Implicit in this holding is
the belief that the ex officio members did exercise significant power
over the operation of the FEC.262 Given this implication, it is surprising that Congress was not conspicuously agitated by the decision.
Throughout the proceedings, Congress never filed a brief or argued
to preserve its relationship with the Commission. One would think
254 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (c) (1994) ("All decisions of the Commission with respect to exercise of its duties and powers under the provisions of the Act shall be made by a majority
vote of the [voting] members of the Commission.").
255 2 U.S.C. § 437(c)(a)(5) (1994).
256 Commission Directive No. 10, Rules of Procedure of the Federal Election Commission, 1 FED. ELECrON C. sp. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 11 2043-44 (Chicago Commerce Clearing
House, 1976).
257 2 U.S.C. § 487(c) (1994).
258 NRA, 6 F.Sd at 827.
259 Id. at 826.
260
The court asked whether "ex ofii non-voting members enjoy a different status for
purposes of constitutional analysis." Id. at 826. And, by finding the FEC unconstitutional,
the court implicitly concluded that there was no difference. Id. at 827.
261 Id. at 827.
262 Id. (rejecting Commission's argument that Congress intended ex officio membership to play a mere advisory role and noting that advice implies influence).
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that if the relationship had provided a powerful means of influence,
Congress would have fought protect it. It did not. To some degree,
this fact undercuts Judge Silberman's theory because it demonstrates
that even Congress did not think that the relationship was influential.
In light of the limited role of the ex officio members, this decision is
puzzling and warrants further discussion.
III
ANALYSIS

A.

Locating NRA's Place in Separation of Powers Jurisprudence

Unlike the appointments clause 2 63 and removal 26 4 cases, NRA
does not purport to rest its separation of powers conclusion on a specific textual provision of the Constitution. Rather, the decision attempts to contribute to the ongoing dialogue by addressing the
ideological foundation of the entire separation of powers doctrine.
Specifically, the D.C. Circuit considered the extent to which courts
should be concerned with legislative efforts to influence nonlegislative
entities. Its effort should be discredited, however, as a formalistic assault upon Congress. Without expressly adopting any particular interpretative ideology, the D.C. Circuit has developed an extreme
interpretation of what constitutes impermissible legislative aggrandizement. The decision's reliance upon this interpretation is its most
troubling feature. The next section addresses this problem.
B.

A Formalistic Assault upon Congress-The Meaning of
Legislative Aggrandizement Under NRA

The NRA court analyzed and resolved the issue of the nonvoting
members of the FEC in a highly formalistic manner. The decision
contains little, if any, contextual analysis. Initially, the court relies on
Bowshwis rigid and simplistic proposition that Congress may not exercise executive powers.2 65 More importantly, the N-RA opinion demonstrates how the unsupported fears of legislative aggrandizement
reflected in CAAN can be expanded to the administrative context. As
in CAAN, the NRA court perceived the FEC's composition as an innocuous arrangement of power that presented a blueprint for legislative
263
264
265

See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1989); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
NRA, 6 F.3d at 826 (citing Bowsher to support assertion that "Congress may not

appoint the voting members... [of] any agency with executive powers"). In addition, the
court found that the FEC was influencing executive powers despite the Commission's independent agency status. In the NRA opinion, the court of appeals made no effort to
determine whether there is a qualitative difference between those powers exercised by the
Executive and those exercised by the FEC. Id. at 826-27.
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tyranny. 266 In defining legislative aggrandizement, the N-RA court expressed extreme skepticism toward Congress's ability to legitimately
participate within the administrative sphere. 267 And although James
Madison's suspicion of Congressional power has generally pervaded
judicial interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine, 26 the
NRA case offers a notion of power never before suggested.
Although the principle that Congress may not exercise executive
powers has guided formalistic decisions since Bowsher, a few courts
have actually had to determine what it means to control executive
powers. 269 The NRA court held that the ability to advise or influence,
even minimally, constituted control. 270 This inflexible and unyielding
approach significantly discourages legislative initiative in a manner
271
that borders on a constitutional presumption against Congress.
However, the court's definition of control does not necessarily follow
from Bowsher, which left the question open.
1. Alternative Approaches Taken By The Courts: Williams, Lear
Siegler and Ameron
In FEC v. Williams, 272 the only other case to consider the constitutionality of the FEC's composition, the Central District of California
took an opposite position to that of the D.C.Circuit in NRA. The California district court explained that:
266

Id. at 827 (noting that the Court in CAANinvalidated the law because "the statutory

scheme challenged . .. provides a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative
power beyond its constitutionally confined role").
267 Id. at 826-27.
268 See supra part IA; see also Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Airport Noise (CAAN), 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991) (finding the Airports Authority statute unconstitutional after notingJames Madison's warning that "power is of an
encroaching nature").
269
Besides NRA, there are four other cases analyzing this issue: Hechinger v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 36 F.3d. 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934
(1995); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd on othergrounds,
893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989); Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs., 809
F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); FEC v. Williams, No. CV 936321-ER (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1995) (Order Re: Cross-Motions for SummaryJudgment).
See NRA, 6 F.3d at 827. The court does not used the word control, but it relies
270
upon Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33, to conclude that Congress cannot exercise executive
powers. Id.
271
NRA, 6 F.3d at 826-27. The court does not actually establish a presumption against
Congressional activity. However, the opinion sends a message that the separation of powers doctrine, a constitutional principle, mandates legislative caution in circumstances
where Congress has the opportunity to influence administrative activity. In light of this
holding, Congress might overreact by closing off avenues of influence. Recently, the effect
of NRA has been evidenced in congressional deliberations over amendments to the Metropolitan Airports Authority Act. See discussion supra note 4.
272
FEC v. Williams, No. CV 93-6321-ER (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1995) (Order Re: CrossMotions for SummaryJudgment). In Wrdliams, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but the case is still pending.
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Although the Court is cognizant of the D.C. Circuit's decision in
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, ... [b] ecause the ex officio members do not vote, it does not appear Congress sought to usurp an
executive function. Thus, the focus of the separation of powers inquiry must shift to whether their presence on the Commission "impermissibly undermines" the executive branch's role. Quite simply,
273
it does not appear that this is the case.
The Williams court cast aside formalism and relied upon a functional
analysis. This court emphasized the importance of considering the
context in which the nonvoting members operated. In Williams, the
court imposed civil penalties upon the defendant for violating FECA
because the defendant had contributed $22,000 to Jack Kemp's 1988
presidential campaign, an amount that exceeded FECA's $1,000
limit. 274 The Williams court did not believe that the presence of ex
officio members on the FEC rendered the Commission's action constitutionally infirm. 2 75 To reach this conclusion, the court relied upon
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman,276 a case
which revisited the constitutional status of the Comptroller General
after Bowsher.
In Lear Siegler, the Ninth Circuit found that Bowsher and Chadha
suggest that:
improper congressional action... [is] the exercise of ultimate authority over an executive official, or a final disposition of the rights
of persons outside the legislative branch. Put another way, the critical issue is whether Congress or its agent seeks to control (not merely
to "affect") the execution of its enactments without respect to the
277
Article I legislative process.
Lear Sieglerinvolved the Navy's (a part of the Executive Branch) constitutional challenge to the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984
(CICA).278 The Act established a system by which the Comptroller
General could investigate protests lodged by frustrated bidders claiming agency failure to adhere to competitive procedures in government
contract awards. 279 Upon receipt of a protest, the Comptroller investigated the matter and issued a nonbinding recommendation to the
agency involved.2 80 The Navy's constitutional challenge in Lear Siegler
focused on a provision of CICA that provided for an automatic stay or
suspension of any contract award or its performance once a bid pro273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280

Id. slip op. at 2 (citations omitted).
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 1-3.
Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1102.
Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1104.
Id.
Id.
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test was timely lodged with the Comptroller General. 28 ' No awards
could be made and contested contracts could not be performed while
282
the protest was pending.
CICA authorizes the Comptroller General to take up to 90 working days to conduct his investigation, with an extension available "if
circumstances require and written reasons are given." 2 3 The procuring agency may, however, override the stay at any time "upon a written
finding that urgent and compelling circumstances which significantly
affect the interests of the United States will not permit waiting for the
decision of the Comptroller General." 284 In this case, Lear Siegler,
which had placed a bid with the Navy to provide fuel tanks, protested
the Navy's decision to award the contract to another bidder, 285 and
brought an action to compel the Navy to comply with the provisions of
CICA. 28 6

The Navy challenged the provision of CICA that conditions the
duration of the stay upon actions taken by the Comptroller General. 28 7 In deciding for Lear Siegler, the Ninth Circuit found that

although the Comptroller General is an agent of Congress under Bowsher, he does not exercise control or ultimate authority over executive
action through the stay provisions.2 8 8 Accordingly, the court failed to
see any existing constitutional infirmities. 2 8 9 The court further justified its holding by noting that because the stay is temporary and the
recommendations of the Comptroller General are nonbinding, the
stay cannot be used to coerce the procuring agency to make a particular final disposition.2 90 "The stay provisions force nothing more than
2 91
a dialogue between the procuring agency and the legislature.
In addition to finding that the stay provisions of CICA did not
control or execute the procurement laws, 292 the court found that the

intrusion on the executive branch's exercise of its delegated procurement power was limited, and therefore constitutional, because the stay
was short and because CICA expressly authorizes the Executive
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 1105.
284 Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2) (A)).
285 Id.
286 Id. Prior to this case, the Attorney General had announced that the executive
branch would not comply with a district court order-or a possible court of appeals decision-upholding CICA. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875,
889-90 (3d Cir. 1986) (Ameron I).
287 Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1108.
288 Id. at 1110.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
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Branch to override the stay.2 9 3 This analysis is neither aberrant nor
exclusive to the Ninth Circuit. In Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers (Ameron i) ,294 a case involving facts virtually identical to Lear Siegler, the Third Circuit concluded that CICA did not give
the Comptroller General control over the procurement process and
therefore was not unconstitutional.2 95 The Ameron court noted that
the Act "encourage[d] the [Legislative and Executive] branches to
work together without enabling either branch to bind or compel the
other. That is the way a government of divided and separated powers
is supposed to work. '296 This additional analysis exhibits the way that
functionalistic ideology focuses upon context.
An equally noteworthy aspect of Lear Siegler is what the court determined to not be the issue at hand. The court noted that the Navy
had not challenged the Comptroller General's authority to issue nonbinding recommendations on bid protests.2 97 As the court concluded, there is no doubt that Congress can constitutionally act to
influence executive officials and others outside the legislative branch
through its opinions and through the "illuminating power of
298
investigation."
In contrast to NRA, Lear Siegleris not excessively wary of legislative
initiatives. The analysis in the decision is much more thoughtful and
comprehensive, and it embraces a functional ideology similar to that
used by the Supreme Court in Mornison and Mistretta.2 99 Following
Lear Siegler, the Williams court found this kind of functional analysis
more instructive. Williams appreciated the fact that, because the nonvoting members of the FEC have no real influence, 30 0 they would be
unlikely to jeopardize the structural balance between the branches.
The NRA case, although recognizing this lack of influence, found it to
be an irrelevant factor. 30 1 In NRA, Judge Silberman failed to consider
the value of the type of analysis suggested by Lear Siegler and Williams.
To date, no court has made any effort to resolve the conflict between
the different conceptions of legislative aggrandizement espoused in
NRA and Williams. In the future, the Supreme Court may decide to
clarify its position, but it is unclear whether there will ever be a case
presented which would enable it to resolve the question of whether ex
293
294
sion in
295

296
297

Id. at 1112.
809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) (case reconsidered in light of Supreme Court's deciBowsher).
Id.

Id. at 998.
Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1109.
298 Id. (quoting Ameron/, 809 F.2d at 992).
299 See supra part I.E.2.
300 FEC v. Williams, No. CV 93-6321-ER, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1995) (Order
Re: Cross-Motions for SummaryJudgment).
301 NRA, 6 F.3d at 826-27.
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officio nonvoting members may constitutionally serve on the FEC.30 2
The D.C. Circuit, however, had an opportunity to examine NA, Lear
Siegler and Ameron in Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports
30 3

Authority.
2.

Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority:
A Recent Considerationof NRA and Lear Siegler/Ameron

In Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, Judge
James L. Buckley, writing for the panel, confronted and navigated
30 4
through the conflicting opinions of NRA, Lear Siegler, and Ameron.
In Hechinger,the court found that an amended version of the Airports

Authority statute, whose original provisions were found unconstituAn interesting turn of events has made it more doubtful that the Supreme Court
802
will ever be presented with another case which would enable it to resolve the question of
whether a Congressional agent may serve as an ex officio nonvoting member of the FEC.
In NRA, the Supreme Court expressed an interest in hearing the case, but later dismissed
certiorari, and therefore allowed the D.C. Circuit opinion to stand. See supranote 5. Because the FEC reconstituted itself after NRA, there remained only a limited number of
cases where a litigant could challenge the presence of the ex officio members. These cases
were those that the FEC had decided to investigate or those which were pending before
the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in NRA. Of those cases, Williams was the only one being
heard by a court outside the D.C. Circuit.
The defendant in Williams has appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but the court has not yet
rendered an opinion. The court may choose to follow NRA and declare the FEC unconstitutional. If that occurred, there would be no split among the circuits. It is unclear
whether, without a conflict between circuits, the Supreme Court would feel compelled to
grant certiorari. Moreover, if the Ninth Circuit found the FEC unconstitutional, and if the
Supreme Court was inclined to agree, it would not, in the absence of a split, need to hear
the case.
Additionally, if the Ninth Circuit affirms the result of the district court and concludes
that the FEC should be able to seek enforcement, the Ninth Circuit need not address the
constitutionality of the Commission. For example, it may choose to follow FEC v. National
Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1995). In NRSC, the court found
that, notwithstanding NRA, the FEC could continue its enforcement action because the
reconstituted Commission had ratified its prior finding that "there was probable cause to
believe a violation had occurred and its subsequent decision to institute this action." Id. In
other words, the court found that the ratification had resolved any potential constitutional
infirmities in the FEC decision to bring a civil enforcement. It is possible that the Ninth
Circuit may choose to avoid the thorny constitutional issue and rely upon NRSC.
Depending upon what happens in the Ninth Circuit, Williams is the next case in which
the Supreme Court could address the question of ex officio members of the FEC. But, for
the reasons mentioned above, there are doubts as to whether that will occur. In a case
which was percolating within the D.C. Circuit at the time of NRA, the court of appeals has
followed NRA and found the presence of the ex officio member on the FEC unconstitutional. See FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court may
decide to hear one of the cases from the D.C. Circuit, but it is more likely that the Court
will act only if there is split among circuits. Thus, much depends on whether the Ninth
Circuit finds the FEC structure constitutional in Williams.
303 36 F.3d 97, ceit. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
304 Id.

1378

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1338

tional in CAAN, was similarly invalid.3 0 5 Reasoning that the separation
of powers doctrine would not be implicated if the Board of Review
established by the original Airports Act was deemed powerless,3 0 6 Congress had attempted to salvage the Act by stripping the Board of Review of its veto power over the Board of Directors.3 0 7 In Hechinger,the
Airports Authority argued that the statute, as revised, relegated the
Board of Review to an advisory role-not one that controlled federal
power.3 08 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit court rejected this argument,
and found that the Board of Review did, in fact, exercise federal
power because the statute granted the Board a range of powers, the
cumulative effect of which enabled it to impermissibly interfere with
the Board of Directors' performance.3 0 9 First, the court noted that
the statute authorized the Board of Review to "request the Authority
'to consider and vote, or -to report, on any matter related' to the two
airports; and the Authority must do so 'as promptly as feasible."' 3 10
Second, under the statute "members of the Board of Review may par31
ticipate as non-voting members in meetings of the Directors." '
Third, "the Board of Review ha[d] the discretion to accelerate the
implementation of a Directors' decision by promptly approving it or
consigning it to the delays and uncertainties of a congressional
review."

3 12

In declaring the amended statute unconstitutional, the Hechinger
court found that the provision enabling the Board of Review members
to serve as nonvoting directors raised the same concerns "underpinn [ing the] decision in NRA Political Victory Fund."31 3 The court
then noted that Congress must limit the exercise of its influence to
the legislative sphere.3 1 4 Although the court identified the problem
with having Board of Review members serve as nonvoting directors,
the court's position equivocates as to whether the presence of the
nonvoting directors, alone, would have been sufficient to find the Act
unconstitutional. The court's remarks regarding this issue are limited
and do little more than echo the words of NRA. 3 15 It does not appear,
however, that the court would have felt completely comfortable with
its decision if it had chosen to rely exclusively upon the nonvoting
305 Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise
(CAAN), 501 U.S. 252 (1991). For a discussion of CAAN, see suprapart I.E.3.
306 CANN, 501 U.S. at 269; see supra part I.E.3.
307
308
309

Hechinger,36 F.3d at 102.
Id.
Id. at 104.

310
311

Id. at 102 (citing 49 U.S.C. App. § 2456(f) (6) (Supp. HI 1991) (repealed 1994)).
Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. App. § 2456(f)(7) (Supp. HI 1991) (repealed 1994)).

312
313
314
315

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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members issue.3 16 If the court had been fully persuaded by the reasoning employed in NRA, the very presence of congressional agents
in a nonlegislative context, regardless of their power, would have demanded judicial invalidation of the statute. In its decision, however,
the Hechinger court was most influenced by the Board of Review's
"power to delay and perhaps overturn critical decisions by requiring
their referral to Congress." 31 7 Here, the court found that this fact
31 8
"tip[ped] the balance" against constitutionality.
In reaching this conclusion, the court did not consider NRA but
simply rejected the Airports Authority's efforts to analogize its circumstances to Ameron and Lear Siegler on the grounds that the authority
wielded by the Board of Review under the Act is "significantly greater
than that of the Comptroller General under CICA."3 1 9 In contrast to
Lear Siegler, the Airports Authority Act does not allow the Board of
Directors to override the Board of Review's decisions, a safeguard that
both Lear Siegler and Ameron viewed as crucial to concluding that the
stay provisions involved in these cases did not vest the Comptroller
General with power over persons outside the legislative branch. 3 20 According to the Hechingercourt, the power held by the Board of Review
32
was far more than merely "advisory" as the defendants claimed. '
Whereas taking advantage of avenues of persuasion may be constitutional, the relationship set forth in the Act created a channel through
which the Board of Review could illegitimately coerce the Directors of
3 22
the Airport Authority to follow any recommendation offered.
Hechingerisa strange opinion in that it uses NRA and Lear Siegler/
Ameron to address independent and separate issues. The court's
choice is especially confusing in that it follows NRA's formalism 3 23 and
Lear Siegler/Ameron's functionalism 3 2 4 at the same time.3 25 It used the
NRA case to analyze the presence of the nonvoting members, but employed the more functional language in Lear Siegler and Ameron to
identify the infirmities in Congress's ability to impact decisionmak316
317

See id.
Id. at 105.

318

Id.

319 Id. at 103.
320 Id.
321
Id. at 105 (citing Hechinger v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 845 F. Supp.
902, 907 (D.D.C. 1994)).
322 Id.
323 Id. at 102.
324 Id. at 103-04.
325 Had the Hechingercourt used NRA to analyze the question of the Board of Review's
discretion to delay the Director's decision, it would have rejected the device outright. The
NRA analysis would have made any consideration of context unnecessary. But, the court
might have felt that it did not need to use NRA because it could refute the Airports Authority's analogies to Lear Siegler/Ameron.
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ing. 326 While Hechinges resolution of these two issues draws from
markedly different ideological roots, the court makes no effort to explain their differences. Rather, the court mechanically applies the
cases without any explanation. Similarly, it is surprising that both
NA and Williams-albeit two opinions from two different circuitshave resolved the same issue without sharing any ideological common
ground. This lack of common ground within the Hechingercase and
between NRA and Williams evidences a damaged separation of powers
doctrine.
C.

The NRA Case and the Health of the Separation of Powers
Doctrine

In the FEC cases, NRA and Williams, the dispute between the
courts involves more than just facts or matters of degree. The courts
differ, not only in their application of the separation of powers doctrine, but also in the methodology they use to reach their conclusions.
Taken together, the opinions reflect the tension between functionalism and formalism in their conception of legislative aggrandizement.
The analysis which follows demonstrates that both NRAS formalism
and Williams'functionalism resolve the FEC issue inadequately. However, whereas functionalism may be saved, formalism is an ailing and
irremediable doctrine. This section suggests that courts should abandon formalism and adopt a functional analysis bolstered by a consideration of individual liberty. The Note concludes that although NRA
may have been right in result, it should have reached its conclusions
by adopting reasoning more cognizant of the values underlying separation of powers theory.
1. NRA's Formalism and Williams's Functionalism
NRA and Williams manifest their critics' worst fears about ex officio nonvoting members of the FEC. In light of NRA's strict formalism, one might ask whether this opinion will stifle legislative initiative
beyond anything intended by the separation of powers doctrine. One
commentator has noted that formalism "restricts innovation in sharing power. '3 2 7 Certainly, NRA is activist in taking a harsh stance
against Congress. On the other hand, one might argue that Williams's

functionalism invites "ad hoc, standardlessjudgment[s]" 3 28 which, Justice Scalia has rather sarcastically explained, "has real attraction ...
[because it] is guaranteed to produce a result, in every case, that will
'3 29
make a majority of the Court happy with the law."
326
327

Hechinger,36 F.3d at 102-05.
Brown, supra note 9, at 1526.

328

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 712 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

329
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Nevertheless, NRA is more troubling than Williams. NRA is the
first case to apply the extreme bias toward Congress legitimized in
CAAN to an analysis of the relationship between Congress and independent agencies. 33 0 Most separation of powers cases do not involve conflict between Congress and state entities, but they often
address conflict between Congress and some other branch or independent agency.3 3 ' CAAN and Hechingerdo not assess whether the
legislative devices examined in these cases would be constitutional in a
conflict between Congress and either the Executive Branch or one of
the independent agencies. Perhaps if the Comptroller General in
Lear Sieglerhad had the same ability to impact the implementation of
decisions made by a procuring agency such as the Board of Review in
Hechinger,the case would have been different. Because NRA impacts
upon administrative agencies, a central feature of government, there
is cause for concern.
The NRA decision is one of the most formal treatments of the
relationship between Congress and an independent agency ever written. This kind of formalism is unnecessary. To begin, formalistic
analysis should be abandoned because, as Professor Peter Strauss has
noted, it "cannot describe the government we long have had, is not
required by the Constitution, and is not necessary to preserve the very
real and desirable benefits of 'separation of powers' that form so fundamental an element of our constitutional scheme."3 32 For instance,
the formal theory of separation of powers that prohibits the joining of
functions is unworkable because it denies the existence of administrative government. Every part of government created by Congress, the
FEC as well as the Department of Justice, exercises all three of the
governmental functions-legislative, executive, and adjudicatory. 33 3
Therefore, it makes no sense to apply formalism to the structural relationships between Congress and administrative agencies if that ideology denies the existence of one of the actors, namely the
administrative agency. The NRA case is an example of the inadequacy
of formalist ideology.
Because of formalism's limitations, Judge Silberman rendered an
internally inconsistent opinion. The particular facts of NRA force this
inconsistency because they involve a challenge to both independence
and legislative aggrandizement-the polestars of separation of powers
jurisprudence. In addressing the constitutionality of the FEC, Judge
Silberman explained that after Morrison "there is not much vitality"3 3 4
See discussion of CAAN supra part I.E.3.
See supra part I.E.
332
Strauss, supra note 25, at 492.
333 Id. at 493.
334
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed,
115 S. Ct. 537 (1994).
330

331
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to the NRA's argument that because Commissioners cannot be controlled or removed by the President, execution of the laws is being
entrusted to someone other than the President who, under Article II,
is to have the sole executive power.335 Morrison,which held constitutional the independent counsel, "approved a much greater diminution of presidential authority than presented in this case."3 36 As
337
explained previously, Morrison relied upon a functional analysis.
The major holding of NRA, finding the presence of the ex officio nonvoting members unconstitutional, employs a formalistic analysis.
Through NRA, it appears that the D.C. Circuit's commitment to
the legitimacy of independence, toward which it adopts a functional
analysis, is inconsistent with its formal stance against Congress.3 3 8
This inconsistency is further revealed when one considers what would
have resulted if the court had applied either a formalistic or functionalist analysis uniformly throughout the opinion. Under a pure formalist analysis, a court would deny the constitutionality of independent
agencies, in addition to invalidating the presence of nonvoting members. 339 Under a functional analysis, on the other hand, the court
would have validated the status of independent agencies, and, like Williams, would have been more flexible regarding the constitutionality
of the ex officio members. 340 Such a functional analysis would necessarily consider the powerlessness of the ex officio members as a major
factor in reaching its conclusion.
As Professor Strauss has noted:
[T]he Constitution describes ...three generalist national institutions (Congress, President, and Supreme Court) which, together
with the states, serve as the principal heads of political and legal
authority.... Each [institution] may be thought of as having a
paradigmatic relationship, characterized by that authority-type, with
341
the working government that Congress creates.
Separation of powers thus requires the courts to consider these relationships between the branches in a contextual manner in order preserve the governmental balance. As suggested by Williams and Lear
Siegler, legislative aggrandizement should be measured in terms of the
335
336

See id.

Id.
See supra parts I.D.3, I.E.3.
Interestingly, the author of NA,Judge Silberman, wrote the D.C. Circuit's opinion
in Morrisonin which the court found the Independent Counsel provision unconstitutional.
The Morrisonopinion is extremely formalistic. The Supreme Court later reversed that decision. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
339 See supra part I.B.
340
See FEC v. Williams, No. CV 93-6321-ER, slip. op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1995)
(Order Re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment); see also supra part I.B. (discussing the
functional approach to the separation of powers doctrine).
341
See Strauss, supra note 25, at 492.
337
338

1996]

NOTE-A BOLSTERED FUNCTIONALUSM

1383

full set of relationships among Congress, administrative agencies, the
President, the courts, and anyone affected by the legislation.3 42
For these reasons, Williams adopts a better approach than NRA
because of the flexibility inherent in its reasoning. However, this flexibility is also William's primary weakness; William's capacity to deal
with an actual legislative threat may, in some cases, be apocryphal. In
other words, the decision may be too standardless and flexible to offer
a sufficient check on congressional activities. This falling does not
suggest, however, that the courts should embrace NRA for lack of a
better choice. William's functional analysis could be sufficiently bolstered to satisfy its critics by a consideration of certain values underlying separation of powers, such as the preservation of individual liberty
and protection from legislative tyranny. As explained in the next section, this approach would differ significantly from that taken by the
NRA court. A full understanding of this approach becomes more evident in the following critique of the D.C. Circuit opinion.
2.

NRA's Failure to ConsiderSeparation of Powers Values

The NRA court defended its formalist approach as a precautionary measure taken to prevent the validation of a statutory scheme
which "provides a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative
power beyond its constitutionally-confined role."3 43 However, the
court's opinion takes an extremely prejudicial position against Congress without articulating adequate justification. That is, even if a
tougher stance against Congress is warranted, NRA provides no reason
for following its methodology. ForJudge Silberman, thwarting legislative initiative has become an end unto itself rather than a means to
achieve some greater purpose. The court was persuaded by James
Madison's argument that the legislature's constitutional powers being
at once more extensive and less susceptible of precise limits, "'can
with greater facility, mask under complicated and indirect measures,
the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments,' ' 344 and concluded that "the mere presence of agents of Congress on an entity with executive powers offends the Constitution. '3 45
Following CAAN and the cautious words ofJames Madison, the court
made this determination because even innocuous arrangements may
provide a "blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power
See supra part Ill.B.1.
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S.
252, 277 (1991)), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994).
344 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
345 Id,
342

343
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beyond its constitutionally-confined role."3 46 There may be validity in
Madison's perceptions of legislative power, and there may be some
utility in invoking judicial distrust of Congress, but that does not mean
that the courts should reject all legislative experimentation in every
situation that appears innocuous. Rather, judicial decisionmaking
should conform to the separation of powers doctrine's "intercon47
nected goals of preventing tyranny and protecting liberty."3
3.

ConsideringSeparation of Powers Values and an Ordered Liberty
Analysis

In a recent article, Professor Rebecca Brown has argued that
the judicial opinions addressing the separation of powers over the
past decade tend to place primary emphasis not on the prevention
of tyranny or protection of individual liberties, but on the advancement of the institutional interests of the branches themselves, as if
that goal were itself a good-a proposition with no historical
348
support.
Similarly, NRA focuses primarily on diminishing congressional power
without considering whether such extremism is necessary in light of
the values inherent in separation of powers theory.
When a court finds that a particular structural arrangement
adopted by Congress is unconstitutional, it denies society the beneficial value of that arrangement. Thus, a court must be extremely careful in determining whether the arrangement is valid, because,
otherwise, the court may stifle legitimate legislative initiatives. Professor Brown has noted that
the judges and academics who take up the subject of separated powers almost invariably invoke James Madison: "The accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands
...

may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny," [but

this] is more a ritualistic gesture than an effort to supply a meaning9

34
ful framework for the inquiry at hand.

To effectively police the doctrine of separated powers, a court must
acutely recognize the doctrine's external values. Brown, who demonstrates a clear link between ordered liberty and the doctrine of sepa346 Id. (quoting Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991)).
347 Brown, supra note 9, at 1534.
348
Id. at 1518 (footnote omitted).
349 Id. at 1515 (footnote omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 313 (James
Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1937)). The quotation from Madison, or language expressing the same idea, can be found in nearly every modern judicial opinion on the subject of
separated powers. See e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-81 (1989); Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-23 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983).
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rated powers, 5 0° argues that the current jurisprudence should be
supplanted by an "ordered-liberty" analysis, which would require
courts to examine governmental acts in light of the degree to which
they may tend to detract from fairness and accountability in the pro351
cess of government.
Brown's inquiry "is not limited to opportunities to enforce actual
rights of litigants [and] it encompasses a much broader arena, including government actions that do not directly injure any specific individual, but alter the processes of government so as to make such injuries
likely."3 5 2 For instance, in cases in which there is no clear property or
liberty interest, but which nonetheless involve impairment of
processes in some way that threatens the values underlying separated
powers, the ordered-liberty analysis "would have the Court ask
whether the challenged scheme fosters tendencies toward inaccuracy,
lack of accountability, or unfairness." 353
4. IncorporatingSeparation of Powers Values into a Functional
Approach
Professor Brown's critique of current jurisprudence and her suggestion that courts should consider constitutional values are accurate.
Her approach is suspect, however, because she ignores purely structural concerns and rejects any consideration of institutional factors.
Brown's theory supplants the separation of powers doctrine with an
ordered-liberty analysis instead of rehabilitating the doctrine itself. At
its core, the separation of powers doctrine remains a structural doctrine: "in the long term, [these] structural protections against abuse
of power were [for the Framers] critical to preserving liberty."3 54 Nevertheless, Brown's words of caution are well taken. Separation of powers jurisprudence should be criticized for its failure to consider liberty
interests; and its guardians, the judiciary, should be encouraged to
recognize purely structural values. But to avoid inconsistency, the judiciary should resolve the tension between formalism and functionalism. The delicate structural relationship between governmental
entities cannot be achieved with two conflicting ideologies. Separation of powers jurisprudence and its structural values should be infused with an ordered-liberty analysis as one of its dominant factors.
As demonstrated above, functionalism is the better recipient of this
infusion.-555 A functional approach dominated by a liberty analysis
350

351
352

Brown, supra note 9, at 1531-40.
Id. at 1531.

353
354

Id. at 1540.
Id. at 1561.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730.

355

See supra part 11.C.1.
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would have been sufficient to decide NRA and to destroy any
"blueprints" for unconstitutional expansion.
In light of this critique, NRA evidences a lazy jurisprudence,
which makes the assumption that separation of powers values can be
fulfilled by employing a simple mechanism that denies Congress a
participatory role in the administrative state. This approach appears
to be a proxy for a more contextual one. For example, the approach
taken by NRA was unnecessary to protect liberty interests. This is evident from a line of cases which have set the standard for determining
due process violations from congressional attempts to influence administrative agencies' decisionmaking. Although these cases are not
controlling, they offer some guidance.
5.

Guiding Principles:Pillsbury v. FTC and DCP Farms v.
Yeutter

Pillsbury v. FTC 5 6 and DCPFarms v. Yeutte 5 7 distinguish the consequences of congressional interference with quasi-judicial as opposed
to nonjudicial proceedings. In Pillsbury, the Fifth Circuit found that
the mere appearance of bias caused by congressional interference violates the due process rights of parties involved in judicial or quasijudicial agency proceedings. 358 Conversely, DCPFarms acknowledged
that in the nonjudicial context "members of Congress are requested
to, and do in fact, intrude in varying degrees, in administrative proceedings," 359 and, consequently, that the "proper standard for evaluating congressional interference with non-judicial decisions of
administrative agencies is whether the communication actually influenced the agency's decision. '3 60 More specifically, the court asked
"whether 'extraneous factors intruded into the calculus of considera''361
tion' of the individual decisionmaker.
In Pillsbury, the petitioner sought review of an FTC order which
found the petitioner in violation of federal antitrust laws. Pillsbury
challenged the order, alleging a violation of its due-process rights on
the grounds that Congress had interfered with the FTC's decisional
process while the matter was pending. 362 In particular, Pillsbury
pointed to a congressional hearing which took place before the FTC
354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992).
358 Pillsbwy, 354 F.2d at 964.
359
DCPFarms, 957 F.2d at 1188 (emphasis added) (quoting S.E.C. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 1981)).
360 Id. (citing Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 714 F.2d 163 (D.C.
Cir. 1983)).
361 Id. (quoting Peter Kiewet Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 714 F.2d 163
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir.
1971)).
362
Pillsbuy, 354 F.2d at 953-55.
356
357
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rendered a final decision. During the hearing a senator had repeatedly questioned the Commission Chairman and other Commissioners
about Pillsbury, and he had criticized the Commissioners for misapplying the antitrust laws in the case.3 63 The action arose in the following manner: In June, 1952, the FTC filed a complaint against
Pillsbury; in April, 1953, a hearing examiner granted Pillsbury's motion to dismiss because the record lacked necessary evidence; on appeal, the FTC reversed.3 64 The Commission proceeded to receive
evidence from interested parties over the next several years. s65 When
the Chairman of the FTC appeared before Congress in 1955, the FTC
had found sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case against Pillsbury for -violating section 7 of the Clayton Act and had given the company an opportunity to introduce countervailing evidence.3 66 The
Chairman appeared before the Senate and met "a barrage of questioning by the members of the committee challenging his view of the
requirements of § 7" of the Clayton Act.3 67 Congress criticized the
Commission's application of section 7 in the Pillsbury case. 368 The
Senators' questions were so probing that the Chairman of the FTC
announced that he would have to disqualify himself from further participation in the Pillsbury case.36 9 Reviewing the order, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the hearings "constituted an improper intrusion
into the adjudicatory processes of the Commission and were of such a
damaging character as to have required at least some of the members
in addition to the chairman to disqualify themselves."3 7 0 The court
was especially concerned with protecting the mental decisional
processes of Commissioners and with the petitioner's right to the ap371
pearance of impartiality.
DCPFarms raises the question of whether the "'mere appearance
of bias or pressure' standard adopted by the Pillsbuy Co. v. FTC court
applies to claims of improper congressional interference with an administrative determination of eligibility for farm subsidies." 37 2 Here,
the USDA's Office of Inspector General released a report documenting abuses of the farm-subsidy program that highlighted DCP
Farms' egregious practices.3 73 Subsequently, the Deputy Undersecretary of Agriculture for Commodity Programs and others met with a
363

Id. at 954-55.

364

Id. at 955.

365

Id.

366
367

Id.
Id.

368

Id. at 956-62 (discussing parts of the transcript of the congressional proceeding).
Id. at 956.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 964.
DCPFarms,957 F.2d at 1195 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1186.

369

370
371

372
373
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key staff aide on agricultural issues for the chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Cotton, Rice, and Sugar. 374 The group specifically
discussed DCP Farms.3 75 The Chairman later wrote to the Secretary of
Agriculture, Clayton Yeutter, expressing concern over the farm-subsidy program and pointing out that "the [DCP Farms] operation violates both the spirit and letter of the law."3 76 In his letter, the
Chairman indicated that if the USDA did not act, he would introduce
legislation to revise the Act.3 77 After receiving the letter, the Deputy
Administrator of the USDA issued an opinion concluding that DCP
Farms was ineligible to receive further subsidy payments. In response,
DCP Farms sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging improper congressional interference violated its due process rights. 378
The DCP Farms court found Pillsbuy's"mere appearance of bias" standard inapplicable because the case did not involve the decisionmaking process of any quasijudicial body.3 79 In contrast to Pillsbury, DCP
Farms involved the administration of a congressionally-created program. The court found that the proper standard for evaluating congressional interference with nonjudicial decisions of administrative
agencies is "whether the communication actually influenced the
agency's decision." 80° The court applied a lesser standard because
"members of Congress are requested to, and do in fact, intrude in
varying degrees, in administrative proceedings."3 8 '
6.

Applying a Bolstered Functionalism to NRA

Pillsbury and DCP Farms offer guidance for determining whether
any liberty interests are involved under the facts presented in NRA.
Under the Pillsbury/DCPFarms dichotomy, to the extent that the FEC
did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers, the legitimacy of
nonvoting congressional agents on the commission would be examined through the DCP Farms standard. The FEC's enforcement
3 82
power has traditionally been characterized as an executive power.
In NRA, the NRA never alleged that the ex officio nonvoting members
374
375
376
377

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

378
379

Id. at 1187.

Id. at 1188.
380 Id. (citing Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 714 F.2d 163
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added)).
381
Id. (citing S.E.C. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 126 (3d Cir.
1981)).
382

The Commission's enforcement power, exemplified by its discretionary
power to seek judicial relief, is authority that cannot be possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress. A lawsuit is
the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and
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had exercised any actual influence over the Commission's decision to
file a civil enforcement action against the group. Nor did the NRA
claim that the Commission was impermissibly prejudiced by the ex
officio members. In fact, it is unclear whether the members were even
present when the Commissioners decided to bring this enforcement
action. Accordingly, if the NRA had made a due process claim, a
court evaluating the NRA case might conclude that there was no violation under the reasoning of DCPFarms because the nonvoting members did not exercise actual influence over the decisionmaking
process. 38 3 Notably, the FEC, unlike many administrative agencies, is
not empowered to hold administrative hearings to adjudicate violations of its authorizing act.3 8 4 The FEC is only empowered to bring an
enforcement proceeding in district court.3 8 5 If the FEC had been authorized to adjudicate the NRA's alleged violation of FECA, a court
might have found that, under Pillsbury,the mere presence of congressional agents on the Commission violated due process.
As argued above, if the NRA had alleged a violation of due process, its challenge would most likely have failed under a Pillsbuiy/DCP
Farms analysis. However, a separation of powers analysis might be different. In conducting that analysis, Pillsbuty/DCPFarms offers guidance in identifying the liberty interests implicated. But, a separation
of powers analysis, concerned with identifying liberty values, would
look beyond the facts of the actual case; it would consider whether the
not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). See Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) ("There is no real dispute that the functions performed by
the independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.").
383 DCPFarms,957 F.2d at 1188.
384
The FEC "may upon affirmative vote of 4 of its members, institute a civil action for
relief.., in the district court of the United States for the district in which the person
against whom such action is brought is found, resides, or transacts business." 2 U.S.C.
§ 437g(a) (6) (A) (1994). In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission may conduct an administrative hearing to determine if the Federal Trade Commission Act has been violated.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTRAR, UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, 605-06 (1994/1995). Similarly, the Occupational Safety and

Health Review Commission is empowered to adjudicate enforcement actions initiated
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Id. at 687.
Elizabeth Hedlund has argued that:
the FEC should be made into an adjudicatory body, one that, once it decides that has been a violation, can levy a fine....
If the Commissioners themselves become the judges, those who decide
whether or not there has been a violation, then they can leave to their very
capable legal staff the authority to initiate investigations and carry them
out
FederalElection Commission Panel Disausion:Problems and Possibilities, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U.
223,238 (1994) (statement of Elizabeth Hedlund).
385 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (6) (A) (1994).
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challenged structural relationship fosters tendencies of unfairness or
arbitrary abuse of power.3 8 6 If the D.C. Circuit had applied this type
of analysis, it could have reached a more reasoned conclusion that the
FEC was constitutionally infirm.
As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley v. Valeo, the FEC is given
"extensive . . .adjudicative powers." The Commission is authorized
under section 437f(a) to "render advisory opinions with respect to activities possibly violating the Act."38 7 Additionally, the Commission is

"charged with the duty ...to receive and pass upon requests by eligible candidates for campaign money and certify them to the Secretary
of the Treasury for the latter's disbursement from the Fund."3 8 8 The
degree of adjudicatory power exercised by the FEC is insignificant
compared to that performed by the FTC because the FTC can actually
adjudicate violations of the Act in question and can compel the defendant to conform to its ruling. However, the adjudicative flavor of the
FEC's powers may implicate Pillsbury's warning that the mere appearance of bias caused by congressional interference may violate the due
process rights of parties involved in judicial or quasijudicial agency
proceedings.3 8 9 Because courts are more sensitive to intrusions within
the adjudicatory context, one might argue that, in this case, the presence of the nonvoting ex officio members fosters tendencies of unfairness or arbitrary abuse, and therefore violates the separation of
powers principle.3 90 If the NRA court had identified this constitutional infirmity, its opinion would have been much stronger.
In addition, even if a court were to find that this arrangement did
not violate the separation of powers doctrine and that the FEC could
continue its enforcement action against NRA, such an opinion would
not be a blueprint for further expansion of legislative powers. As explained above, administrative agencies like the FTC exercise such significant adjudicatory power that the presence of congressional agents
on those entities would definitely violate separation of powers. In its
brief, the NRA argued that if the FEC was constitutionally constituted,
"Congress... could require that one of its agents, nonvoting to be
sure, sit in on [the Supreme] Court's deliberations. 3' 9 1 However, the
above analysis suggests that, because of the liberty interests involved,
3 92
this would be a clear violation of separation of powers.
See Brown, supra note 9, at 1561.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 110 (1976).
388 Id. at 110 n.152.
389 Pillsbury v. FrC, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966).
390 See Brown, supranote 9, at 1561.
391 Brief for NRA at 70, FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994) (No.
93-1151).
392 Id.
386
387
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Instead, the NRA court argued that the mere presence of congressional agents on the Commission violated the Constitution because it gave Congress impermissible access to executive powers. But
as DCPFarmsevidences, courts can apply a more contextual analysis to
gauge the degree of interference with executive powers. This point
was confirmed by James Madison when he wrote that the key to separation of powers for "all sides" was that no branch of the federal government be permitted to have "an overruling influence over the
others." 393 This argument suggests that the functional analysis employed in Williams would be sufficient in cases in which no liberty interest was involved. As the facts of NRA indicate, Congress never
obtained "an overruling influence" over the FEC's administrative powers. Therefore, in NRA, Williams would have offered a more appropriate answer regarding the degree of control exercised by Congress.
A functional analysis bolstered by a liberty analysis of the constitutionality of the FEC will survive attacks that it opens the door to more
egregious statutory schemes. Congress would not be free to place its
agents as nonvoting members on the boards of all administrative
agencies. Because most agencies possess adjudicatory powers, placing
congressional agents on those entities would more seriously implicate
liberty interests. Therefore, a court would find the placement of congressional agents on these agencies unconstitutional. This approach
is preferable to that taken by the courts in NRA and Williams.
CONCLUSION

The D.C. Circuit's formalistic assault upon Congress in FEC v.
NRA Political Victory Fund represents the most extreme position ever
taken against Congress regarding its structural relationship with administrative agencies. Although Judge Silberman cloaked himself
with James Madison's cautionary words regarding the power of the
legislature,3 94 the extreme bias demonstrated in NRA is unsupported
by established separation of powers principles. As this Note has argued, the D.C. Circuit's reasoning can be traced to a line of Supreme
Court cases which have distinguished between independence and legislative aggrandizement. However, regardless of the value of this device, separation of powers demands a purposeful analysis-one that is
concerned with individual liberty and protection from institutional
self-dealing. The Court's adoption of this judicial tool should not suggest that legislative initiative be eliminated without a consideration of
context or of the purpose of separation of powers. Not every congressional relationship with independent agencies is a "blueprint" for ille393
394

THE FDERAusT No. 48 (James Madison).
See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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gitimate legislative expansion. That kind of reasoning would stifle
important and innocuous legislative reform. Moreover, courts cannot
continue their strict adherence to bias against Congress without abandoning ideological consistency-functionalism and formalism cannot
coexist within a coherent separation of powers framework.
The separation of powers doctrine exacts a price by subordinating efficiency in return for protection against tyranny. The Constitution envisions an optimal structural balance and mandates limits to
legislative experimentation which sometimes serve as an obstacle to
reform. Thus, the Supreme Court should warn against a hyperactive
policing of separation of powers because that would compel unnecessary sacrifice and harm. For this reason, the logic of the NRA case
should be discarded as a dangerous impediment to legislative initiative. This Note has instead offered a more appropriate approachfunctional analysis bolstered with a complete consideration of the inherent values of the separation of powers doctrine. This rehabilitated
doctrine conforms to the constitutionally authorized balance without
thwarting all legislative initiative. If the Supreme Court ever addresses
this issue again, it should abandon NRA's formalism and adopt the
bolstered functionalism articulated by this Note. And, even if the
Court never has another opportunity to hear such a case, the extremism of NRA should serve as a wake-up call for those who have cast a
blind eye upon the gutting of this sacred constitutional doctrine.
Peter S. Guryant
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